UK Parliament / Open data

Coroners and Justice Bill

The mandatory life sentence for murder is an anachronism and it is not benign either. I support what has been said by all speakers so far in this short debate for the reason that is central to the case that they make—that every murder differs in important respects generally from another. The circumstances in which murders are committed are infinitely variable. That truth has had to be recognised by the various administrative devices that we have adopted over the years to deal with it. It would be far better for the trial jury, suitably directed—I shall come to that in a moment—to give its opinion, after it has heard all the witnesses and seen the evidence, on whether extenuating circumstances exist. I find it difficult to understand the visceral opposition that exists in some quarters because in the same quarters there is a passionate and correct upholding of the jury system and the jury’s right to determine guilt or innocence. It would be far better to extend that, so that a jury might say, "Very well—guilty of murder. But having heard the judge’s direction as to whether there exists evidence that may be capable of being seen to be extenuating, we think that such evidence does exist and that there are extenuating circumstances". This amendment will retain the life sentence as a norm, but it will mitigate its propensity to produce an incongruous result. It is important to bear in mind that the judge must direct the jury that in his view, if they are satisfied that the defendant is guilty of murder but are of the opinion that there were extenuating circumstances, they may return a verdict to that effect. However, he may not give such a direction unless there is evidence on which a jury might reasonably find. It is also important to preserve the discretion of the Attorney-General to refer the matter to the Court of Appeal if he or she believes that the sentence is unduly lenient. It will also be another ground for appeal to assert that the judge was wrong in directing the jury as he had and that there was evidence capable of such a finding. For reasons which have been touched upon, a certain amount of courage will be needed if this is to be accepted—a certain amount of courage, but not much. It ought to be found.
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
713 c1013-4 
Session
2008-09
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
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