Policing and Crime Bill

My Lords, I think I understand the basis on which the noble Lord makes his contention in relation to submissions, but I am afraid that I do not agree with him. In cases where a person who is the subject of an extradition request is serving a sentence in the United Kingdom, the Extradition Act allows a decision to be made about whether extradition should be deferred until the end of that domestic sentence. These amendments would require that, prior to extradition being deferred, the judge or the Secretary of State must consider whether any of the statutory bars to extradition apply. The thinking behind the amendments appears to be, as I understand it, that if on the facts of the case there is an obvious bar to extradition, this matter should be considered prior to deferral so that the criminal in question does not have the extradition proceedings hanging over his head while serving his United Kingdom sentence. While I can see the thinking behind this amendment, I resist it on three grounds: first, the terms of the Act make it unnecessary; secondly, the mischief the amendment is targeted at does not on closer scrutiny exist; and, thirdly, it would result in an unnecessary burden being placed on the extradition system. I shall deal first with necessity. It is important to note that if a person is serving a sentence of imprisonment in the United Kingdom, the Extradition Act makes it clear that whether or not extradition proceedings will be deferred is a matter for the discretion of the decision-maker. This means that the judge or the Secretary of State can look at all the facts of the case and decide whether in fact the proceedings should be deferred. This means in practice that in the rare case where an obvious bar to extradition is engaged, the subject of the extradition request would be able to trumpet this fact in arguing that the proceedings ought to be determined right away rather than deferred. There is, accordingly, scope within the legislative framework on deferral for the issues raised by these amendments to be fully and, I respectfully suggest, appropriately considered. That is why we do not believe that the amendments are necessary. As to the mischief at which the amendments seem to be targeted, I contest the notion that it is really that much of a hardship for someone serving a criminal sentence properly imposed by a United Kingdom court to know that at the end of a sentence they will be required to face extradition proceedings. The Extradition Act contains a wide range of safeguards which ensure that no one will be extradited from the United Kingdom without due process being observed and guarantees in particular that extradition will never take place where it would give rise to a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. Your Lordships know that our courts are very jealous about their observance of those provisions. This is an important point to make, as it means that no one serving a domestic sentence and who is the subject of adjourned extradition proceedings need have any concern that they have the prospect of treatment contrary to the Human Rights Act 1998 hanging over them once the proceedings restart. My final observation on the amendments is that they would in most cases require the statutory bars to extradition to be considered twice—once prior to deferral of the proceedings and once again when those proceedings eventually resume. Given that the resources of our extradition system are already stretched, this, with the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is unjustifiable. It simply does not, in our view, make sense for issues to be determined on a provisional basis well in advance of the potential date for extradition and then be considered for a second time at the point of extradition, by when those factors may well have changed. I understand why the noble Lord raises this issue, but I hope that he will say that his amendment was probing, he has had satisfaction and that we can happily put the issue to one side.