Policing and Crime Bill

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 141 and 141A on timing. The effect of these amendments is to require the courts to impose a specific duration on the injunctions and to prevent the renewal of such injunctions. Amendment 141 suggests a maximum of two years and Amendment 141A suggests a maximum of three years. We on these Benches are not particularly exercised about which of these is the most desirable, but we feel it is important that this House debates whether there should be some specified time limit. During the legislative scrutiny of the Bill, the Government were asked why they considered it to be necessary and proportionate to permit indefinite injunctions and whether they had considered setting out in the Bill the maximum duration of an individual injunction. The Minister in response said that the Government had considered this possibility, but had concluded that indefinite injunctions might be necessary for some respondents. According to the Minister, ""it may not be possible, at the time of granting the full injunction, to assess in any accurate sense how the behaviour of the respondent may change or develop"." He also expressed concerns that injunctions of maximum duration might be sought by the courts without consideration being given to the merits of the individual case. Actually, I think he was underestimating the care which the courts usually give to such decisions. In addition, he was concerned that injunctions could not be extended at the end of their maximum length, even if it were necessary to do so. On that basis, the Minister stated that the Government were satisfied that, ""leaving the question of the duration to the courts is both preferable and reasonable, thereby ensuring that applicants and courts consider in each case what duration is really warranted"." The Minister also suggested that individual rights were safeguarded by permitting applications by either part to vary or discharge an injunction and the holding of review hearings by the court. However, review hearings are not mandatory, but may be ordered by the court. During the Joint Committee hearing in another place on 26 February this year, at col. 597, the Minister stated: ""It is unlikely that the courts will grant an order with indefinite conditions without setting a review hearing. The guidance will also encourage the setting of review hearings for longer or indefinite injunctions"." It would be good if they did. Clearly, therefore, the Government do not want to tie the courts’ hands and believe that time limits for reviews could encourage courts to grant injunctions for the maximum time permitted. Looking at similar injunctions or order-making powers, it appears that ASBOs may be of indefinite duration, but are subject to a minimum length of two years. Violent offender orders—VOOs—which were considered by the House during the passage of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill last year—are also subject to a minimum two-year and maximum five-year period, with the possibility of renewal. So we have a mixed situation with regard to similar orders. We on these Benches accept that the question of whether there should be a maximum limit on the duration of a gangs injunction is difficult. However, we are unconvinced by the Government's arguments as to why injunctions of indefinite duration are necessary. For example, justifying the need for indefinite injunctions, the Government told us that it would be difficult for applicants or the courts to assess how an individual's behaviour might change over time. In our view, such a problem could easily be resolved by the applicant seeking to vary an injunction to take account of any changes and the court holding a review hearing, at which the respondent could make submissions. The Government assert that they are concerned that having a maximum duration for a gangs injunction might lead to applicants seeking injunctions for the maximum period, without regard to individual circumstances. There is another way of looking at that. Alternatively, the availability of an injunction for a finite period may serve to focus the efforts of investigators to obtain the material that they may need to be used in evidence in a proper criminal prosecution, rather than rely on the indefinite availability of a gangs injunction. We would rather put the onus there and on that evidence-gathering. To summarise, we do not believe that it is sufficient to rely on the courts to ensure that the operation of an individual or gangs injunction is not indefinite or so intrusive that it breaches human rights obligations. We have considered comparable powers and the Government's arguments, but still we favour both a maximum duration and a prohibition on its renewal. We feel that that should come back to be looked at afresh, rather than just renewed. Those limits would operate both as an important safeguard of the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR and as a discipline on the investigative and enforcement authorities to find material capable of being used as the basis for a criminal prosecution within a reasonable time. With those reasons, I beg to move.