UK Parliament / Open data

Coroners and Justice Bill

Before I respond to the amendment, I pass on the apologies of my noble friend Lord West of Spithead, who—partly, I suspect, because of the speedy passage of business in the past hour or so—is not able to be present due to government commitments. He very much wanted to take part in this debate. I hope that the Committee accepts his regret that he is not able to be present. Members have already recalled the depth of the debate that we had on a previous occasion, which is undoubtedly why the contributions of the noble and learned Lord and other noble Lords, reiterating positions previously taken, have been modest in length and have not repeated the argument to which my noble friend Lord West of Spithead sought to respond. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has pointed out, my noble friend gave a commitment to establish such a role at Third Reading on the Counter-Terrorism Bill on 17 November. We have heard again, very much in shorthand form, many arguments from those who favour such a position. Although the case that the noble and learned Lord and others is one in which they believe strongly—on the occasion that we last considered it, it brought forward a lot of sympathy across the House—I am afraid that the Government cannot accept the amendment. Since the debate last November, we have consulted further with the police, prosecutors and the Courts Service, in Scotland and Northern Ireland as well as in England and Wales. As a result of those consultations, we now believe that an independent commissioner as envisaged by the amendment would have a detrimental effect on the conduct of terrorist investigations. Two main arguments have been made for establishing an independent commissioner. The first is that judges who consider extension applications do so on the basis of limited information and that the police do not conduct investigations quickly enough. That is why Amendment 187 provides for an independent commissioner to advise a judge at extension hearings on whether continued detention is justified. It is worth pointing out, however, that judges are already required by legislation to ensure that suspects are not detained for longer than necessary and that investigations are carried out "diligently and expeditiously". The application by police or the CPS for extended detention is a rigorous process; it is not a rubber-stamping job. Indeed, an independent report of the inspection of the counterterrorism division of the Crown Prosecution Service in April this year found that, in all pre-charge detention cases that were reviewed, extended detention had been applied only where it was properly justified. The second argument for an independent commissioner is that the commissioner would ensure that suspects were not ill treated and thus provide communities with reassurance. Many of your Lordships will know that PACE code H already sets out the detailed conditions for detention of suspects. It includes access to medical assistance, legal advice, visits from friends and family, provision for religious observance, exercise, meals and reading materials. All interviews with suspects are already recorded. Again, it is worth noting that there have been no complaints from suspects that PACE code H has not been adhered to or that the conditions of their detention have not been satisfactory. Against the arguments in favour of an independent commissioner for suspects, we also have to look at the views of those who deal with the process on the ground—the police, the prosecutors and those who deal with the application for detention in our courts. As I said, we have consulted further all these organisations. Their strongly held view is that allowing a commissioner a role in extension hearings would delay those hearings. The question was raised: why was there police concern? One aspect of it is that there is a belief that suspects will insist on the commissioner being present, therefore delaying interrogations, briefings, conversations—call it what you will—while the commissioner is found, and that they will insist on interviews with the commissioner for reasons that will delay prosecution. The period between arrest and charging is one of considerable pressure and there are concerns that unannounced visits from the commissioner and the need to provide him or her with papers again would delay investigations, achieving the exact opposite of what is intended by the proposal. It is also possible that suspects could use the role of the commissioner to manipulate and control the time available for an investigation. As I said, the police were concerned about people requesting private interviews or insisting on the presence of the commissioner in police interviews. There are clear and strong operational reasons for not establishing an independent commissioner of the sort envisaged by the amendment. There is also a case for saying that such a commissioner is unnecessary. Suspects’ interests are already looked after by independent reviews in three different bodies. It might help if I briefly say what those are. First, the Police Reform Act 2002 already provides for independent custody visiting of persons held in police detention, including those detained under counterterrorism legislation. Custody visitors can make random, unannounced visits to suspects and can discuss with them their treatment and conditions of detention. They may examine custody records and inspect detention facilities. A report is completed after each visit. Secondly, in 2008, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Prisons and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary began jointly to inspect prison custody suites. They have unfettered and unannounced access to such facilities and can interview detainees. Part of their role is to ensure adherence to PACE codes and the appropriateness of treatment and conditions in which suspects are held. Thirdly, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, already has a statutory role in relation to the operation of the Terrorism Act 2000. That includes visits to custody suites and reporting annually on the operation of pre-charge detention. Therefore, there are a number of very strong independent safeguards to ensure that suspects are properly detained and their welfare is looked after. Finally, I point out that the role envisaged by this amendment would be too much for one person. The noble and learned Lord referred to Paddington Green as the centre where this would take place. However, over a nine-month period in Northern Ireland, the independent commissioner for detained terrorist suspects conducted 61 visits and interviewed detainees on 122 occasions. That involved only one place of detention. We therefore assess that at least five commissioners would be required to cover the whole United Kingdom, particularly as suspects are increasingly likely to be detained outside London. Assuming that each commissioner would cost in the region of £50,000 per annum, we estimate that the cost would be a minimum of £250,000 a year, not the £50,000 figure that the noble and learned Lord refers to. For these reasons, I unfortunately cannot accept this amendment. That said, there are a number of things that we can do to provide further reassurance on the detention of terrorist suspects. First, we can look at extending the role of independent custody visitors. In particular, the role could be extended to provide an annual report to the Home Office specifically in relation to custody visits that involve the detention of terrorist suspects. It may also be possible to extend their role so that they can view recordings of any interviews with a suspect, as is now the case in Northern Ireland. Additional training could also be given specifically on the detention of terrorist suspects before charge. Secondly, we could ensure that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was informed of all arrests under Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000. He would then be able to visit any detention facility where suspects were held and to view interview tapes. He can already attend any extension hearings that he may choose and he can reflect the outcome in his annual report on the operation of terrorist legislation. Given that, I therefore ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment. If that is not possible, I am afraid that the Government have no choice but to resist it.
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
712 c998-1000 
Session
2008-09
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
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