Coroners and Justice Bill

I find myself in agreeable consonance with the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, and the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza. I have been influenced in reaching this view by reading the Law Commission’s reports on both these matters: the offences of seditious libel and criminal libel. It is worth reminding the Committee that the offence of seditious libel is a common law offence and, in so far as it is capable of specific definition, it is said by the Law Commission to be the, ""oral or written publication of words with a seditious intention"," and, ""an agreement to further a seditious intention by doing any act"." The Law Commission goes on to quote Sir John Stephen, at Article 114 of Stephen’s Digest of the Criminal Law. He seeks to address the definition of a seditious intention and deals with it in the following way: ""A seditious intention is an intention to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite disaffection against the person of His Majesty, his heirs or successors, or the government and constitution of the United Kingdom as by law established, or either House of Parliament, or the administration of justice, or to excite His Majesty’s subjects to attempt otherwise than by lawful means the alteration of any matter in church or state by law established, or to incite any person to commit any crime of disturbance of the peace, or to raise discontent or disaffection amongst His Majesty’s subjects, or to promote feelings of ill will and hostility between different classes of such subjects"." On the face of it, therefore, the offence is pretty broad. However, as the Law Commission goes on to remind us, it has to be proved that in committing this offence there was an intention to cause violence. In defining an intention to cause violence, the Law Commission relies particularly on a Canadian case called Boucher, which concerned a pamphlet issued by a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses attacking the police, public officials and the Roman Catholic clergy on the grounds that they persecuted members of the sect and alleging that the clergy unjustifiably influenced the courts and the administration of justice against them. The court in that case held that, ""the seditious intention upon which a prosecution for the seditious libel must be founded is an intention to incite violence or to create public disturbance or disorder against His Majesty or the institutions of Government. Proof of an intention to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of subjects does not alone establish a seditious intention. Not only must there be proof of incitement to violence in this connection, but it must be violence or defiance for the purpose of disturbing constituted authority"." As the Law Commission went on to say in its report and as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, has underlined, the definition of the intention to cause violence is amply covered by a range of offences already on our statute book with respect to incitement or conspiracy to cause violence in the context of the law against inflicting injury on a person or property—or indeed, the law relating to public order disturbances. In other words, there is nothing in the definition of seditious libel that is not covered by other law. When it came to removing the offence of blasphemy from our statute book last year, I voted against doing so because I believed that the Christian culture that was encapsulated in the offence of blasphemy had an important historical resonance for our constitution. I feel no such emotion in respect of the offence of seditious libel. Therefore, I am most happy to support the promoters of the amendment. I have nothing to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Lester, or the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, said about the offence of criminal libel, but I am equally happy to see it struck from our criminal law.