Coroners and Justice Bill

I support this humane amendment because it is about preventing suffering—not the suffering of the terminally ill patient who goes to be assisted to die; this new clause seeks to prevent the suffering of their loved ones. The loved ones go to Switzerland or wherever because they love the terminally ill person. It is against their instincts to help their father, wife or mother to die, but they believe that they cannot let them die alone and they go with them to a country where it is lawful. That is what the amendment seeks to achieve. It is, as has been said, a very narrow amendment. It talks only about clarifying the law and protecting some of the terminally ill people who might otherwise have gone overseas to be assisted in dying. It is not about the decriminalisation of assisted dying. So much has been said about that in the debate, which has focused in many ways on assisted dying, that I would like to touch on some of the points that have been made against it. I do so not to promote the Bill that I originally introduced, but to deal just with errors of fact and approach that have emerged during the debate. It is naturally impossible for the opponents of the amendment to provide direct evidence of the dangers of a slippery slope, which they allege the amendment would pose. Accordingly, they must rely on conjecture, speculation and, in some cases, their own experience of what they are totally confident will happen. However, because there is no direct evidence, surely it makes good sense to go to a country where assisted dying has been legal for 10 years, and to explore what is happening there. Is there indeed a slippery slope? Let me tell noble Lords the facts of the latest annual report of the Oregon public health department, which relates to the years 1998 to 2008. It shows that in 2008 there were 50 assisted deaths in Oregon, representing 0.2 per cent of total deaths. The previous year there were 49 deaths, and 48 deaths the year before. The year before that there were 47—hardly a slippery slope. The report also states that the Oregon medical board found no violation of good faith compliance with the Act. There is clearly no evidence whatever of a slippery slope in Oregon, so the question that the opponents of the amendment need to answer is: why should it be different in England and Wales? The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, says that there are scoundrels among the medical profession in this country. That may be so, but presumably there are scoundrels in all professions everywhere and this has not led to slippery slopes. Talking about Oregon, I come to some of the facts. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, says that the amendment is unworkable. I was with him and the Select Committee in Oregon. The law there, on which the amendment is to some extent modelled, worked perfectly well. I think nine groups testified to the Select Committee, including the nursing association, the hospice association—a medical association that was neutral on the issue—the government department and the hospitals. Seven or eight groups out of nine felt that the law was working satisfactorily. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, talked about doctors shopping in Oregon and told us about the extraordinary number of prescriptions issued by particular doctors. If you read the Oregon public health department’s 2008 report, you see that 59 physicians wrote the 88 prescriptions that were issued, which does not sound very much like doctors shopping to me. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, mentioned that in Oregon there were a number of terminally ill patients who received prescriptions and did not exercise them. The evidence that we heard in Oregon was to the effect that this was so. Those patients who had prescriptions felt that, when they received their prescription, an enormous load was lifted from their shoulders because they knew that, if things got out of control, they could end their suffering by ending their lives. The noble Lord, Lord Walton, spoke about his Select Committee finding that it was totally against euthanasia and assisted dying. There was an intervening Select Committee, which heard evidence from everywhere in the world where assisted dying and euthanasia were legal, and did not come to the same conclusion. We have heard much about safeguards. There were many safeguards in the several Bills that I have introduced. Those were Bills with a much wider remit than the present very modest amendment, and where opponents would argue that the safeguards were insufficient. I would go away and come back with new safeguards, only to be told that these new ones were insufficient, and so on. Then I posed the question of which safeguards would the opponents suggest including. The answer, I was told, was that no safeguards would ever be sufficient—clear evidence of a very open mind. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, talked about a cultural shift in the law. For hundreds of years, there was strong opposition to decriminalising suicide as its criminalisation was considered to be an essential law. In 1963, after all that opposition over so many years, the law was changed. If the message would be sent out to disabled people that their lives are not valued, as has been said by many Peers, why was suicide decriminalised? Surely that sent out the same message as that which, it is alleged, is now being sent out by legislation on assisted dying and, indeed, by this amendment. There is no intention to treat disabled people in such a way as to breach their human rights, or suggest that they are less worthy of care and attention than anyone else. The noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, said that I told her that I wanted to help disabled people. That is only part of what I said. I said that I wanted to help all people, and that I thought disabled people should have the same right to make decisions about their lives as every person who is able-bodied. I always understood that the battle for the rights of disabled people is for them to have equal rights. I listened with great respect to everyone who spoke against the amendment. My name was mentioned several times, so I am entitled to raise the points that I wish to make. I come back to safeguards. The noble Lord, Lord Walton, gave evidence to the Select Committee. He was asked what further safeguards he thought could be inserted in the Bill. His answer was that he could think of no further safeguards. We have a simple amendment before us concerned with the prevention of suffering. The Committee should focus on the fact that we are talking only about people who are acting out of love and affection for the people whom they are accompanying to Switzerland or elsewhere in order to give those people whom they love care and support when they make their very final decision. The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, said that he was sure that, if this amendment were passed, assisted dying would inevitably be legalised. I say to him with respect that whether the amendment is passed or not is not relevant to the final decision that will be taken. In a democratic country, where 80 per cent of the population support assisted dying, it will eventually be decriminalised.