Coroners and Justice Bill

The fact that they felt that there was no obligation to raise a prosecution showed that the circumstances in their view made that a proper decision. But that was done after consideration by the director. We all know that there are two stages in prosecution policy: first, the question whether there is evidence sufficient to justify a prosecution; and, secondly, the question whether it is in the public interest that a prosecution should be brought. It was on the second of these questions, at least in some cases, that the decision of the director rested. That could be a fundamental safeguard against the possibility that vulnerable people might be manipulated to go to Switzerland in order to end their lives. The cases in the books about undue influence show how a person can take a decision that, without the activities and information provided by, in particular, relatives, might not have occurred. I have thought of an example of how this might work. The son of a person suffering from a terminal illness, who had a considerable prospect of continued life, was affianced and decided that he would like to obtain a house. The deposit necessary for the house approximated to the savings that his mother, the terminally ill patient, had in the bank. In order to relieve her symptoms of pain for a time to come, obtaining a drug not authorised on the National Health Service by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence would require a substantial outlay of expense. In bringing these circumstances closely to the mother’s attention and the possibility of her going to Switzerland to enable her to end her life there, the son brought the mother to conclude that this might be the right thing to do. In accordance with the procedure in the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and explained to her by her son, she went through with it. In such a case, the present law would allow the Director of Public Prosecutions to consider the conduct of the son in relation to the whole background of the case. A protection is afforded in that way to vulnerable people against exploitation. There is one aspect that I want to mention in conclusion. When the committee of your Lordships’ House that was investigating these matters some time ago was in Oregon, it was told that quite a substantial proportion of the people who made declarations sufficient to get the prescription for bringing their lives to an end did not, in fact, do so, despite having come to a settled conclusion that they wanted to. Quite a high proportion had the prescription given to them and never used it. That means that the person who signs the declaration in the amendment may nevertheless, at a later stage, wish to change his or her mind. The relative going with the individual could—I do not say "would"—have motives that were not altogether altruistic. It might be difficult for the person, in the face of that accompaniment, to change their mind. The amendment constitutes a change in the law that would deprive vulnerable people, at a vulnerable stage in their lives, of a protection that the law currently affords. The fear of prosecution is quite an important aspect of the prevention of crime in many of our arrangements. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, suggested that he was proposing new safeguards, but they are of course optional. The present law is staying, so somebody who did not wish to take advantage of the amendment would simply proceed without it. Therefore, the amendment does not produce any more protection than the present system. On the basis that the present law is in fact as the Court of Appeal thought that it was, my submission to your Lordships is that the amendment should not be agreed to.