Coroners and Justice Bill

I, too, support the amendment. As a circuit judge, I never had to try a person for murder, but more than 40 years ago, when I was a Minister in the Home Office, one task was to advise the Home Secretary of the day on the issue of life sentences. One realised then how much of an obscenity some of those cases were when a mandatory life sentence had to be passed. The noble Lords, Lord Neill and Lord Pannick, pointed to what the ancients used to call pious perjury, whereby a jury would go out of its way to find that there were some circumstances that would save a person from the injustice that would otherwise be brought upon them in that particular case. There are cases that call for our attention, and there are three things that we can do. One is to do nothing but to hope that in some way the political parties will be educated and will educate their supporters to be responsible and just in these circumstances, allowing much greater flexibility for the sentencing judge in cases of murder. That is a far-flung possibility that we may not live to see come about. Secondly, we could define each and every one of the categories, which would be a recipe for disaster, as there will always be categories beyond our comprehension that will turn up in cases from time to time. The third possibility is to accept the amendment. It is not perfect but, if King Solomon was sitting in judgment in the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, I doubt whether he would be able to bring about a perfect solution to the situation. It is not perfect for this reason. Imagine a typical afternoon, when many juries up and down the country have been sent out to consider a verdict of murder. Some come back having been given this direction; it is only within the scope of the test of reasonableness that the judge will have spelt out to them that they will be able to come to the conclusion concerning extenuating circumstances. Each jury is an individual and unique animal, and a jury in Chelmsford may find that there are circumstances that are within the ambit of the amendment, while a jury in Chester, in circumstances virtually identical, will find that there are not. That, I am afraid, is the price that has to be paid for bringing about the advantage that the amendment carries with it. It may be that members of the general public will say that within the ambit of that test of whether there is evidence on which a jury can find reasonably, each jury is acting almost like a legislature. However, in many respects, juries are acting as legislators in any event. So I have those words of reservation, but only because I appreciate that the situation is intractably difficult. This is almost certainly the best solution yet suggested in this context.