Policing and Crime Bill

Amendments 31, 32, 34 and 35 in this group stand in my name, and I will deal with each in turn as quickly as I can. Amendment 31 is relatively straightforward and would ensure that the Secretary of State had to consult the APA and ACPO before issuing guidance about collaboration. That is only common sense, as they are the bodies responsible at national level for the other legs of the tripartite police governance arrangement. They are also the bodies with the practical experience of collaboration to be in a position to ensure that any guidance is workable. My remaining amendments essentially approach the same problem in slightly different ways. That problem is, of course and yet again, the wide-ranging powers for the Secretary of State set out in the new section about directions. The powers are particularly pernicious, because at best they can generously be interpreted as micromanagement, but at worst they represent a means by which policing could be restructured through the back door. I am sure that the Minister will assure me that that is definitely not the intention of the Government but, once the powers are there, someone someday might find it convenient to use them in a way which was not originally intended. My first and preferred solution would be to remove the powers altogether. That is the approach taken in Amendment 32. Incidentally, that would also apply to the following new section, which is about terminating collaboration agreements, but one amendment in that respect will suffice to make my point. However, I am sure that the Minister will remind us all how important the future stability and resilience of policing is. No doubt he will argue that the Secretary of State should, in extremis, be able to exercise powers to ensure that the police service is fit to meet the very real challenges it faces from serious crime and other such threats. Therefore, I have also suggested an alternative approach to moderating the way in which the powers of direction can be used. Amendment 34 levels the playing field to ensure that the Secretary of State must use the same criteria demanded of police authorities in judging whether or not to collaborate. That would ensure that the yardstick for all must be efficiency and effectiveness, and that the Home Secretary cannot exercise the draconian powers using other, unspecified criteria. Amendment 35 then provides that the powers of direction can only be used following the arrangements in Sections 40 and 40B of the Police Act 1996. Those sections set out very specific criteria and processes by which the Home Secretary can give directions to police authorities and chief officers. It would mean that directions could be triggered only when there was evidence that existing arrangements were failing to support adequate performance. The new section also ensures that directions can only be given to chief officers through the police authority. That is a very important safeguard to prevent direct political interference in policing by central government, and is a fundamental tenet of ensuring that policing is kept independent of the state. In addition, the powers of direction under the new section are subject to HMIC's view about the merits of the proposed direction. Finally, the authorities and forces concerned must be given an opportunity to make representations about the proposals. In tabling the amendments, I have sought to restrict what are very draconian, centralising powers. If the powers cannot be removed from the Bill altogether, they at least require reasonable checks and balances to ensure that they are not misused.