This, again, has been an interesting debate which has strayed quite widely. I shall deal first with the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, about the strategy and where we are heading with this. We recognise that, overwhelmingly, people want to work: work is good for people’s health, it is generally their best route out of poverty and it is good for their self-esteem. Given all the data about the disadvantages that accrue in workless households and pass from generation to generation, providing people with the opportunity to participate in the labour market is a vital strand of government policy.
If that is our starting position, how does it work so far as the benefit system is concerned? We are seeking to implement the Gregg model effectively, which states that there are people who are work ready; people who need a progression to work to enable them to access the labour market; and people who should have the opportunity to engage in programmes but on whom no requirement should be placed. That is the package of measures and the thrust behind the Bill.
So far as the structure of the benefit system is concerned, I agree that we should be structuring a system whereby the support you get is not dependent on the nature of the benefit you receive but is personalised and dependent on what most helps you to remove the barriers which prevent you accessing the labour market. Again, this is what we are doing, in part, with the Bill. Specifically, it remains an aspiration to end up with a single working-age benefit. It will be hugely complex to move from where we are to that objective but we have laid the groundwork in the Bill. It provides the prospect of removing income support from the system so that we end up with two working-age benefits, one associated with ill health and disability and one with the rest. We believe that is the right way to go. So that is the strategy and the wrap around for this.
So far as sanctions are concerned, if someone is sanctioned the system has not worked for them because we want a regime that encourages people to take up the opportunities that are there. We are learning from the experiences of our European colleagues—in particular the Dutch, the Danes and the Swedes—and considering how they can be brought to bear in a UK context. We are looking carefully at the position of carers and how best to support them. The link between how social care operates and how people who cannot work because of carer responsibilities should be supported is a difficult one. We agree that the current system is not satisfactory; that is why the Government are working on proposals which they look to bring forward in due course.
Amendments 29, 30, 32, 33 and 34 seek to remove the requirement for lone parents and partners of certain benefit recipients to undertake work-related activity as part of the conditions for full benefit entitlement and to allow the parent to choose if they want to participate. Those who do would have an entitlement to undertake personally-tailored, work-related activity. But by doing so, the amendment retains the status quo in that parents with a youngest child of seven or below would not be required to undertake work-related activity to help them move closer to the labour market.
We know that the vast majority of those on benefits aspire to work at some point in the future and that paid work is good for them and their children in nearly all circumstances. Paid work for those who can is the most sustainable route out of poverty. To help more parents to meet their aspirations and do more to eradicate child poverty, we have continued to invest heavily in evidence-based policy responses over the past 10 years. The changes that we are discussing today are a further step forward along that path. They include the introduction of the voluntary programmes, such as the New Deal for Lone Parents and the New Deal for Partners. At the moment, these can be accessed voluntarily by parents at any time and they offer tailored advice by personal advisers. Therefore, they are already part of the system.
These programmes can give advice on the types of jobs available in the local labour market and can help in drawing up a personalised action plan to help parents to prepare for and access those jobs. They can also provide advice on the availability and range of formal childcare services in the local area, including details of where to access further information—for example, through a children’s centre or an extended school. They can signpost parents to advice on debt management or careers advice, and provide information, if appropriate, on the support available when starting work—for example, on tax credits. They provide support with the transition into work, such as in work credit and the in work emergency discretion fund. They can arrange work-related training to enable parents to update or develop their skills, as well as providing help with travel and registered childcare costs while they undertake a course. Therefore, that opportunity is there for people at the moment.
We know that our personalised support programmes, such as the New Deal for Lone Parents, help individuals into employment. We also know that combining programmes such as the New Deal for Lone Parents with work-focused interview conditionality increases take-up of support and movements into paid work. This combination of programme support and conditionality works for many people in improving health outcomes, lifestyle and outlook.
That is all positive. However, as we have taken forward evidence-based policies, we have learnt that there is more to do. We have learnt from the current conditionality and support regime that we have in place that there is still a significant disparity between the numbers who would like to move into paid work and those who take steps to achieve this. The current regime does not work as well for those further from the labour market, and taking new steps to bridge this gap gives us the potential to make a further significant reduction in the number of children who still live in poverty and to improve their life chances. We therefore want parents in the progression-to-work group to undertake a reasonable and personalised set of requirements. This should help to ensure that more of them feel that they are supported in realising their aspiration to return to paid work when they are ready to do so. To do this, they will have to follow another clear piece of evidence. We have learnt that regimes work best where the claimant believes that the process is intended to be supportive and where he has co-ownership of the return-to-work process.
To deliver on this, we have asked clients to agree with their adviser the steps that they are willing to take to make progress towards a return to work at the appropriate time for them. In order to help them to achieve this, we will provide a system of highly flexible and personalised support from the outset. Therefore, the model of conditionality and support that we want to test is based on an expectation that they will actively engage with their adviser on an ongoing basis; that they will consider, discuss and agree with their adviser an action plan comprising activities that they think will improve their prospects of moving back into work; and that they will undertake these agreed activities as part of their own journey towards employment and then, if required, follow directions from advisers where strictly necessary, underpinned by an ultimate recourse to sanctions for those who fail to engage with support without good cause.
In addition, we will ensure that we adopt a very broad definition of work-related activity that encompasses both more traditional training skills and job-related support and wider, socially inclusive measures, such as volunteering, undertaking parenting programmes or visiting a debt adviser. This will ensure that the agreed work-related activity is personally tailored to the individual.
I now turn to Amendments 35, 39, 40 and 41. As part of these pathfinders, we wish to test the effectiveness of an escalating sanctions regime based on the principles recommended by Professor Gregg in his independent review. As noble Lords will understand, it is sometimes necessary to use compulsion to encourage people to acknowledge their responsibilities, such as undertaking work-related activity that will benefit both their child and themselves. In cases where this mandatory requirement is imposed, ultimately we will need a sanctions regime for those who do not meet the requirements. We know that sanctions drive the behaviour of jobseekers, and we would expect this to apply also to the progression-to-work group.
However, this Government have always endeavoured to ensure that sanctions are a last resort and we have incorporated significant safeguards to support potentially vulnerable people. For example, we have good cause provisions and appeal rights, an ability to waive and defer any requirements, and reminders to customers when appointments are due. Only clear refusals to engage with reasonable requirements without good reason result in sanctioning activity. To date, the small number of sanctions applied through, for example, Pathways to Work, suggest that we have largely been successful.
As part of these pathfinders, we wish to test the effectiveness of a more progressive regime based on the principles recommended by Professor Gregg in his independent review. This needs to be clearly understood, use different ways to encourage re-engagement, and always offer speedy and simple routes to customers to end any sanctions imposed. We wish to discuss our plans further with stakeholders before we bring forward regulations.
However, I thought that it would be helpful to the Committee to set out a broad outline. Our plan is that any first failure by a customer to take part in a work-focused interview or undertake work-related activity or, as appropriate, take part in a work-focused, health-related assessment should not result in a financial sanction, as it does now. Rather, we want to issue people with a formal, final written warning so that they definitely understand the need to undertake the necessary requirements. This will back up earlier explanations by advisers and should serve significantly to reduce the numbers of people who actually receive a financial sanction in the pathfinder areas. Only where there are further, consecutive failures to complete any of the necessary activities without good cause will financial sanctions be applied.
For both employment and support allowance and income support customers, this will probably mean short-term reductions in benefit for two and then four weeks. Rates of reduction will be as now. In all cases, these can be lifted early where a person starts to re-engage in the progression-to-work process by attending a work-focused interview. Where even this fails to spur a customer to re-engage and there are further consecutive failures to meet requirements, our advisers will try to use their powers of direction to kick-start the necessary engagement. The ultimate backstop for repeated non-compliance will be a reduction in benefit levels to jobseeker’s allowance hardship payment levels. However, where this level of non-engagement has occurred, we plan to build on earlier contacts and ensure there is a full investigation of circumstances to work out whether there is some fundamental barrier to meeting requirements that has previously been missed.
Overall, the sanctions regime that we plan to test should be more visible, rely on a wider range of tools to engage customers and lead to fewer financial sanctions. It will build on the safeguards currently available. In this way we hope that it will support the positive and helpful progression-to-work regime that we are looking to build.
Amendment 35 removes new subsection 2D(4)(e) which deals with polygamous marriages recognised by the law of the countries in which they were conducted. This regulation-making power will ensure that each member of a polygamous relationship will be subject to the appropriate conditionality regime. Without this power we may not be able to achieve that aim, and some people would then not get the help and assistance they need to return to work.
With that reassurance and explanation, I hope that noble Lords will withdraw their amendments.
Welfare Reform Bill
Proceeding contribution from
Lord McKenzie of Luton
(Labour)
in the House of Lords on Monday, 15 June 2009.
It occurred during Debate on bills
and
Committee proceeding on Welfare Reform Bill.
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
711 c213-7GC 
Session
2008-09
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House of Lords Grand Committee
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