Coroners and Justice Bill

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this interesting and important debate. I will try to establish some context. The noble Lord, Lord Henley, invited me to do that in numerical terms. That will stretch me somewhat, but I will do my best. He suggested that inquests that take place with a jury made up about 4 per cent of cases a year. Our figure is 2 per cent. It means that fewer than 500 inquests across the whole of England and Wales take place with a jury. We do see the provisions in this clause increasing the number of inquests with juries. It may go up from 2 per cent to 3 per cent. There will be an increase, because of the provisions of the Bill designed to meet the representations that have been made during this debate today, about areas where real concerns have been expressed and where the value of juries has been extolled. Of course, noble Lords are absolutely right when they put forward that principle; it is an important part of a democratic society. However, the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, raised the question of what the principle is behind this clause, and whether it was back-to-front. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, answered that point better than I could. The presumption behind the legislation is the practice of the nation at the present time and always has been: namely, the vast majority of inquests take place without a jury, but provision needs to be made for a jury in significant and particular cases. The point about Clause 7(3) in those terms is that it makes provision for judgments that a jury should sit. But of course we anticipate, under our proposals, that the vast majority of inquests will continue, as they have always been, to be determined by a coroner sitting alone, rather than with a jury. After all, coroners are highly knowledgeable and increasingly well trained. We are intending to improve that training, of course, with the provisions in Clause 30. With the coroners’ independence of mind, I am content that they should be able to continue to hold most inquests sitting alone, with a jury present only where there is a clear need for the additional level of public scrutiny. I will come on to the representations made during this debate about situations in which that additional level of public scrutiny would take place. Clause 7(3) contains provisions to give coroners discretion to summon a jury if they feel there is sufficient reason for doing so, even if the death concerned does not fall into the categories mentioned in Clause 7(2). There is also the safeguard in Clause 32(2)(g) relating to appeals where an interested person may appeal to the chief coroner if he feels that the coroner should exercise his or her discretion differently. That is the context behind this clause and the propositions in the Bill. I want to look at the detailed arguments advanced about cases where inquests should be conducted with a jury. Of course, I understand the thinking behind Amendment 16, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, which requires that an inquest into the death of a person caused by an act or omission by a member of the security services should be held with a jury. We are not aware of any such deaths being subject to inquests in the past 50 years, so we are discussing a marginal provision, so marginal that, although the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, advocated his case on principle, I do not think we need it. If such a death were to occur, and given the fact that we have not experienced one in the past half century, it is surely preferable and sufficient to allow coroners to use their discretionary powers under Clause 7(3) to decide whether they wish to conduct an inquest with a jury in those circumstances. After all, the coroner will be aware of how exceptional the circumstances are and will therefore exercise careful judgment. The second amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, could lead to a substantial increase in the number of inquests that would require a jury to be summoned, given that there is a wide range of circumstances in which the provision could be said to apply. I shall make the most obvious point. Road traffic deaths in this country are too high. We have had considerable success in recent years in reducing fatalities on the roads against a background of road traffic increasing almost year by year, but road traffic deaths are still numerous. They run into the thousands. Is it suggested that almost all of them should come within this provision? After all, almost all of them involve issues of public safety. By definition, we learn from deaths on the road, and public policy is affected accordingly. However, it is a big leap from a necessary learning process with regard to accidents to a provision that might lead to the interpretation that because every road death potentially has some implication for public policy, in all such cases inquests should be held with a jury.