Coroners and Justice Bill

I speak briefly in support of the spirit of all the amendments in this grouping. I have been fascinated by the arguments put forward by noble Lords, and I am pleased to say that most of the points I wanted to make have already been made. I do, however, wanted to reinforce some of the comments made by my noble friend Lady Murphy about black, minority and ethnic people in respect of this particular issue. As she pointed out, black people are very much over-represented in the mental health system and in the prison system: they are more likely to be sectioned under the Mental Health Act and more likely to be among those detained and awaiting deportation under the Immigration Act. In fact, black Britons are over 44 times more likely than their white counterparts to be detained under section in the mental health system, despite having similar rates of mental ill-health as other ethnic groups. Especially relevant here, as my noble friend Lady Murphy has pointed out, is that people of African-Caribbean descent are much more likely to be given high doses of potent behaviour-modifying drugs and are much more likely to be physically restrained. This has led to a number of fatal, tragic outcomes: she mentioned the case of Rocky Bennett as one of those. These issues are not exclusively the concern of black and minority ethnic communities—of course they are not. That has been amply illustrated. I do think, however, as is often the case, what has had a negative impact on one section of society indicates that the system is not working as effectively as it should for people in general—particularly those in vulnerable positions. Currently Clause 7 of the Bill provides that deaths in detention—as has been said—will be heard before juries only if a very limited set of circumstances is satisfied. This is not sufficient to ensure that such deaths in the mental health sector or other public authorities are fully and independently investigated, or to give the public confidence in the system. Again, this was pointed out earlier. Juries do give a degree of openness and transparency required in these tragic circumstances, and they are fundamental to democracy, as they represent the only opportunity where ordinary people—independent of state authorities—can participate in the judicial system. This is particularly important where the state is implicated in a death, or where there is even a question mark about the possible role of the state in a death, and it is particularly important also for those who come from vulnerable communities and lack confidence in the system because of their negative experiences. Limiting the calling of juries to the types of cases outlined currently in subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 7 is insufficient. It would mean that cases of negligence or gross negligence, neglect and systemic failures might not be heard before juries, and this will further damage the confidence of the public and the families, and will not ensure that that sense of independence and impartiality is in the inquest system. All inquests into deaths in state custody or detention should automatically be brought before a jury, in my view. I hope we will get a further chance to discuss this shortly.