Coroners and Justice Bill

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this very important debate. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, criticises the narrowness of this part of the Bill. Why are the matters to be ascertained so narrowly? I suggest that it is because the nature of coroners’ investigations is different from other forms of legal proceeding. The purpose is to establish facts; it is not to apportion blame or establish legal liability. That is an important principle. Of course, modern law has altered. The European Convention on Human Rights has had an effect and I shall say something about that. Clause 5 needs to be read in conjunction with Clause 10—that was referred to by my noble friend Lord Dubs—and paragraph 6 of Schedule 4. Clause 5 merely outlines what the legal purpose of the investigation is, and the information that such an investigation has to ascertain. Clause 10 clarifies that any determination or findings are framed in a way that does not determine any question of criminal or civil liability because that is not the function of an inquest; that is the function of a criminal or civil trial. Coroners retain the ability to give a narrative verdict. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 4 gives the coroner the power to make a report on actions to be taken to prevent other deaths. These powers combined give a very wide ambit for coroners to make whatever comments they deem necessary. It seems to us that Amendment 7 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, seeks to extend the remit of the matters to be ascertained as part of a coroner’s investigation to an unnecessary extent. We fear it would mean that all cases are investigated to an extent that ascertains not only the immediate factual details of the case—in other words, the identity of the deceased person concerned and how, when and where they died—but the broader circumstances leading up to and surrounding the death. As the law stands, and in the Bill as drafted, such an extensive investigation is required only in cases where Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights is engaged. As the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, gave his helpful, graphic example, I thought that that case seemed to me to be, prima facie at least, an Article 2 case. Such an approach would lead to a significant drain on resources and to delays in holding inquests and in most cases add little to the totality of knowledge about a death. I stress that coroners already have, and under the Bill will continue to have, the ability to conduct a wider investigation into any deaths that they have a duty to investigate. Clause 5(2) merely reinforces the fact that in cases where Article 2 is engaged, coroners must—I emphasise "must"—ascertain the wider circumstances leading up to and surrounding the death as part of the investigation. In cases where Article 2 is not engaged—and there are many of them—coroners may still examine the wider circumstances leading up to and surrounding the death if they consider it appropriate to do so. With regard to looking at the wider circumstances of any death caused by suicide, I understand fully the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, at Second Reading that there may need to be some distinction between the means of death—that is, by what method the deceased person concerned killed themselves—and the circumstances in which they came by their death—that is, what triggered within them the desire to take their own life. However, our view is that this issue can more properly be addressed by guidance from the Chief Coroner specially tailored to those deaths rather than placing a blanket requirement in the Bill. Turning to Amendments 8 and 11, I agree that deaths may occur in certain circumstances where Article 2 rights are not engaged and where therefore the requirement to hold a wider-ranging investigation under Clause 5(2) does not arise but where there would nevertheless be benefit in the broader circumstances of the death being investigated—the type of case to which my noble friend Lord Dubs referred. This may be for the reasons stated in the amendments before us today or for other reasons. I repeat that the discretion to carry out a wider-ranging investigation already exists and will continue to exist under the reformed coroner regime. The coroner has the discretion to set the scope of an inquest and may decide to investigate the broad circumstances that caused or contributed to any death, even if Article 2 is not formally engaged. Given that broad discretion—and I should add that this is a matter on which the new Chief Coroner may decide to issue guidance—we do not believe that it is necessary to list in the Bill the circumstances contained in the amendments. In addition, the Bill was strengthened in the other place in respect of following up recommendations to prevent future deaths. That is why Schedule 4 and Clause 29 provide for the Chief Coroner to receive all reports from senior coroners on the matter of preventing deaths, together with the responses of the recipients of those reports, and for the Chief Coroner to then summarise them every year in his or her annual report to the Lord Chancellor. I move on to Amendments 9, 10 and 29. We are concerned that these amendments would take the coroner system back to the days to which the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, referred, when coroners had a role in the detection of crime and would routinely attribute blame and assign civil or criminal liability. During the previous century, coroners’ duties in these respects were gradually reduced. For example, the Coroners (Amendment) Act 1926—I do not suggest that the matters that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, was talking about occurred prior to 1926—introduced the requirement for the adjournment of an inquest until the completion of indictable criminal proceedings. Concern over coroners’ possible encroachment into areas of criminal justice were renewed in 1975, as some of us will remember well, when a coroner’s jury named the missing Lord Lucan—my officials asked whether I should refer to him as the noble Lord, Lord Lucan—as guilty of the murder of his children’s nanny. This anachronism was removed by the Criminal Law Act 1977, which excluded the question of criminal liability from the purposes of the inquest. The matters listed in the amendments that I refer to are, in our view, matters that are far more suited to coroners’ reports to prevent future deaths. A coroner could, quite properly and legitimately, give his or her view on such matters in any report to prevent future deaths. The Government place great store on these reports that are currently made under rule 43 of the existing Coroners Rules 1984, and will in future, as I have said, be made under paragraph 6 of Schedule 4 to this Bill. Similarly, Amendment 12, which seeks to remove subsection (3) of Clause 5, would remove the obligation not to express an opinion with respect to the matters to be ascertained under Clause 5(1) and (2). This obligation is there because the matters to be ascertained under these clauses are matters of fact. There should not be room for additional opinion in determining these matters. I shall point out that subsection (3) of Clause 5 contains the proviso that it is subject to paragraph 4 of Schedule 6, which I have just referred to. There will also be scope, within the underpinning rules, for narrative verdicts, which coroners and juries, when directed to do so, make use of when it seems a more appropriate format than a so-called short-form verdict—such as "death by misadventure" or "death by suicide"—in order to reflect the circumstances of the death. Those provisions give enough scope for coroners and juries to make known matters that they believe ought to be made known. As I understand it, they do not have to relate to Article 2 cases. I turn to Amendments 26 and 28. I want to assure my noble friend Lord Dubs and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that Clause 10(2) is not intended to prevent a coroner or jury considering facts bearing on civil or criminal liability in order to reach a determination. A determination pointing to responsibility for a death will not offend subsection (2) of Clause 10, provided that it is framed in such a way so as not to appear to determine any question of criminal liability on the part of a named person or any question of civil liability. Again, I do not believe it is necessary to state this on the face of the legislation. We would be particularly concerned by any changes to the law that allowed the determinations and statements made by coroners or juries to be framed in a manner that could lead to comments on matters of criminal and legal liability, as Amendment 26 would appear to ask to allow. We have doubts that simply stating on the face of the Bill that any determinations made under Clause 10(1)(a) should not be construed in that way, as Amendment 26 suggests, would be sufficient to prevent this from actually happening. Coronial determinations or findings that can be construed as apportioning blame could well have an influence on later proceedings when matters of civil or criminal liability are being dealt with in the courts. We want to avoid the situation in particular where a possible murder or manslaughter trial is prejudiced because the jury are aware of determinations and findings made at an inquest that appear to have already indicated a person’s guilt. I turn finally, but not at all least, to Amendment 27, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, which would require every coroner verdict to use an, ""internationally agreed code for the cause of death"," and include a narrative description. As we understand it, the first part of her amendment would, in practice, mean classifying each cause of death into a category recognised by the World Health Organisation. I accept that, on the face of it, that amendment may make it easier to compile statistics on the causes of death, so that deaths can be centrally collated to reveal trends and clusters. That is her case, I think. We fear that, in practice, it could mean that coroners would feel compelled to apply a classification that did not accurately reflect how someone died. Why is this? This is because not every death investigated by a coroner will be caused by a disease or health problem listed in the International Classification of Diseases. Having said that, we recognise the importance of statistics to inform future public policy but we believe that coroners need discretion in order to give a verdict that reflects the particulars of the individual case. The amendment would also require a narrative verdict in every inquest. We do not consider such a requirement to be necessary or appropriate. Coroners are already aware of the option of a narrative verdict, but in most cases short-form verdicts are perfectly adequate to convey the cause of death accurately to the satisfaction of all parties and interested persons. It has been a fascinating debate, and I feel that we may return to this later in our discussions, but I have tried to explain to the Committee tonight why we are not immediately attracted to the amendments.