Policing and Crime Bill

Of course, Madam Deputy Speaker, it is a matter for your discretion, but I hope that my hon. Friend catches your eye, because I want to listen carefully to her remarks, as I do to those of other Members. She has a great deal to say about the psychological pressure that women are put under in such circumstances and about the concern that our current definition will not address that, but let me make it clear—this goes back to what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak—that we do not want to exclude any vulnerable woman in prostitution from the protection afforded by the offence. So we will be interested to hear views on this important matter if my hon. Friend and other hon. Members who want to express them are called to speak. I hope that my explanation has at least highlighted the difficulty of defining what we are trying to combat. I also hope that a constructive process continues, building on the work done in Committee. I am grateful to right hon. and hon. Members for their views. I turn now to strict liability. Amendments 235, 236, 237, 238, 239 and 240 replicate amendments that were tabled in Committee and would remove the strict liability aspect of the offence. I am grateful for the dialogue that we have had, for the prospect of further amendments that will allow the debate to continue and to the Joint Committee on Human Rights for its report on the Bill. We particularly note the Joint Committee's comments in relation to the offence's compatibility with article 8 of the European convention on human rights. However, we do not accept the Committee's conclusions. We are satisfied that the new offence complies with both the European convention and principles of common law. We do not accept that article 8, which is about the protection of person's private and family life, includes a right to pay for sex. In any event, we consider that any interference with a person's private life would be in accordance with the law and can be justified as necessary for the protection of health, morals and the rights and freedoms of others. The JCHR has suggested that the offence is not sufficiently certain; we simply disagree. We believe that the clause is clear. A person will know that if they pay for sex with someone who is found to have been controlled for gain, they commit an offence. If someone who intends to pay for sex has any doubt as to whether the prostitute is being controlled for gain, they can choose not to pay for sex with that person. The amendments that we have tabled to clarify the scope of the offence will make clearer the circumstances in which it will be illegal to pay for sex with a particular person, and that should help people to regulate their behaviour accordingly. I have noted the points raised in Committee by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and by a number of hon. Members, and I hope to be able to address all their concerns explicitly. None the less, we still believe that strict liability is the most effective way of ensuring that those who pay for sex are forced to consider the circumstances of the prostitute providing the sexual services, and of protecting those who have not chosen to be involved in prostitution. It is vital, and right, that we do not ignore the desperate and exploitative circumstances that affect some of those involved in prostitution. It will not be a defence to say, "I didn't know that this person was controlled for gain." That is the key aim of the offence—to ensure that sex buyers are held responsible for their conduct, and to ensure that we deal with those who fuel demand for prostitution. Strict liability is fundamental to ensuring that.