Political Parties and Elections Bill

I should remind the Grand Committee, as I mentioned at Second Reading, that although I do not have any pecuniary interest, I was a member of the informal advisory group of parliamentarians convened by the previous chair of the Electoral Commission. I am not quite clear as to whether I still exist in that role, because that group has not met since the appointment of the new chair. We turn to a very important issue that has preoccupied a great many people: whether or not there should be at the highest level in the Electoral Commission people with direct political experience. Clause 5 in an important way modifies the previous Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. I should say at the outset that I was agnostic to this proposal, partly because of my experience in the informal group of parliamentarians. I have come around to it and, therefore, I have the merit of conversion, having looked at the arguments very carefully, which are more balanced than perhaps some are prepared to admit. I have looked carefully at the evidence given to the Committee on Standards in Public Life on this issue, and at the conclusions reached by Sir Hayden Phillips. These are important issues and I hope that the Grand Committee will forgive me if we spend time on them, because this is our only opportunity to discuss them. This is our only amendment on the body of Clause 5 and it is important that we examine it with some care. I was struck by some advice given to the Committee on Standards in Public Life. Those who were doubtful about the proposition made much of the fact that commissioners might see themselves as representatives of political parties, and indeed of the leaders of those parties at the time, rather than feeling that they were bringing to the corpus of information and experience of the commission a more practical approach than perhaps has been apparent in the commission’s relatively short life. The argument was made to the committee that the Electoral Commission should not only be above party political wrangles, but should be seen to be above them. The previous chair, Sam Younger, made the point strongly. In his evidence to the committee, he said that, ""the one thing we"—" that is, the commissioners— ""do not have is the experience of operating as either elected politicians or actively within parties. Therefore we need to have access to that expertise and experience, and that we recognise … There are various ways we have tried to plug that gap. Most recently, and I think probably this is overdue, and I hope it will work and is without prejudice to what might happen in the future either statutorily or otherwise—but we have established a small reference group of three members of the House of Lords, three members of the House of Commons, from each of the main parties"." That is the group to which I referred. It was clear that the commission and the chairman saw that there was a gap there, but they were not enthusiastic about filling it on a statutory basis. There were others who gave advice to the committee. My right honourable friend Alan Beith MP, who was probably then the chairman of the relevant Select Committee—this was a few years ago—said that: ""There were other cases where I think the Commission did not understand the distinction between those things which confer advantage on a candidate in an election, and therefore should be looked at and costed by them and declared to them, and those things which are part and parcel of being a member of parliament and carrying out public duties ... All of these things, I think, illustrated a lack of awareness of what went on in the real world of being a politician and not of a partisan character"." The committee took a great deal of evidence from active politicians and others on this issue. I have one more quotation, this time from Lord Holme, who sadly is no longer with us. He gave a great deal of thought to this and, as chairman of the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House, was very exercised by the failure to take account of the experience of other countries. He said, in evidence to the committee: ""I think there is a danger that you get what has happened with the Federal Electoral Commission in the States, which has really just become a forum in which the parties negotiate. It is really no more than that; it is a place, as you have no doubt observed, where the parties cut their deals. I think that would be extremely undesirable ... There is a danger, if the party nominees bounce in ""the traditional way, that you are implicitly saying to the other members of the Commission, ‘You sit back while the politicians do the deals’. I do not think this should be a deal-led body; I think it should be a public-interest, rule-led body"." I am sure that all Members of the Committee would say amen to that. Clearly it would be the wrong way to go. The recommendations of the committee were firm: if there was going to be change—and this was very much the desire at the time—the new commissioners should be appointed as individual members of a unitary board, not as representatives or delegates of a particular political party. The committee set out some proposals to try to achieve that. Turning to the Hayden Phillips investigations of these issues, much of that evidence was again reflected in the analysis that was the subject of that inquiry. His conclusion was: ""Would the addition of these four Commissioners unbalance the Commission itself, causing it to be divided along party lines? … The majority of Commissioners would not come from the political parties and the four with party experience would not be representative of their parties. For the most part, I would envisage that they would be former politicians, men and women who understand party politics but whose primary allegiance as Commissioners would be to the public interest, rather than to the partisan cause"." That is the point that we address in Amendment 74. Frankly, the way in which that is currently set out in the Bill gives no guidance to the party leaders, let alone to the general public, regarding the sort of experience and expertise that will be expected of these four commissioners. The last thing we would want is four splendid individuals who are redundant politicians and who have ceased to have any real value but may be rather difficult to satisfy in terms of something to keep them out of the way—people such as myself. That would be entirely inappropriate. We have to be extremely careful that the party leaders, individually and collectively, are given guidance about what will be expected. Hence, our emphasis on diversity. We see it as important that the party leaders talk to one another so that the four representatives are not all from the same sort of stable—all elderly, male, white, former party apparatchiks. As we say very clearly in our amendment, we are looking for a number of people who have relevant experience in the conduct of elections and the organisation of political parties but who also bring to the commission some diversity of representation. As I said at the outset, it is extremely important that, once someone is nominated, he or she is not seen as the representative of a party, let alone a party leader. Party leaders change, and the last thing we want is for someone who is put on to the commission to feel that they are there at the mercy or whim of the party leader. As I said, party leaders change, and we do not want a lack of continuity or consistency in the contribution that can be made. Just as dangerous would be to have a yes man or yes woman who was simply there to represent the views of the party hierarchy. If we are going to try to ensure that there is direct experience of the way in which elections happen at the grass-roots level, that is not the sort of person who should be eligible for this purpose. It is not entirely clear—I hope that in responding the Minister will be able to give us some guidance—whether the term of office and general responsibilities of these new commissioners will be exactly the same as set out in Schedule 1 to the PPERA. If so, we might find that they are rather too much at the mercy of their nominating party leader. This is a good moment to ask the Minister whether there will be security of tenure. This is a dangerous thing to say, I know, but we are all aware that at the moment in your Lordships’ House we are here for life; we are not in any way—I shall have to be very careful where I tread here—at the mercy of our party leaders. There may be other considerations as to whether or not we remain here, but that has its own merit and it is a hostage to fortune, not least in the terms set out by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. However, it is important that the commissioners are not seen to be there simply for a temporary period while a particular party leader thinks that they will be good representatives of his or her interests and his or her party. Therefore, the whole issue of security of tenure is extremely important. We hope that the Minister and other Members of the Grand Committee will see this as a practical way to face up to an important issue. It is an important change to the mode of operation of the Electoral Commission. Just as important is the change to perception that the public and those active in the political world have of the commission and the way that it operates. Given experience since the PPER Act, there are anxieties about the extent to which the commission has its feet on the political ground. However, we would be stepping in the wrong direction if in the process, either in practice or in perception, we gave it the impression that it was to be the creature of the political leaders. I beg to move.