Coroners and Justice Bill

I want to follow on from the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard), the right hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Frank Dobson), and the hon. Members for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd), and for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell); the latter introduced the concept of Strawism, and made an important point. I have been in the House for a very long time now—30 years, I think. During that time, an Official Secrets Act was brought forward. I remember that the first intimation, or leaks—that is frequently how Governments are run—were that Lord Hurd, as he now is, was about to introduce into the House a truly draconian measure. When the Bill was published there was such relief that the full weight of all that had been leaked was not to come about that the House almost passed it with a sigh that this was a major improvement. It is true that sometimes our fears are too great, so any concession inclines us to be more respectful of the measure before us. I have difficulties with the Bill and they centre on clause 11. The right hon. and hon. Members whom I mentioned spoke about a profound principle in our system of law and liberty. The circumstances into which a coroner may inquire are the most obvious ones. We would want to know the circumstances leading to someone's death in the protection or custody of the state, and whether the death was murder, whether it occurred in suspicious circumstances, and so on. There is a wider public interest in that matter, not just the family, although one understands and reaches out because the death of a member of the family is of crucial importance to the family and to neighbours and friends. It is also of crucial importance to us as a society. Why bother to have coroners' courts if we are not interested in the circumstances of an unexpected or unexplained death that happens in our midst? Clause 11 has been said to deal with secret inquests. Indeed, it does invoke secrecy,""in order to protect the interests of national security"." Who are we to argue what national security constitutes? That, essentially, has been the argument of the Executive through the ages. We must determine that because we cannot know what it is that we must secure in the national interest. We have moved on from that. I give the example of the injunction that the Nixon Administration tried to secure against The New York Times in the case of the Pentagon papers. The American authorities insisted that there could be no revelation of the papers, which went to the security and heart of the American state. They dealt with the Vietnam war. A judge decided the matter and the papers were published in The New York Times. No state fell. America progressed and retreated from Vietnam. What was in the public interest? Was the secrecy in the public interest? "National security" was the cry. Absolute national security was what the Nixon Administration demanded. They were denied it by the independence of a judicial process. Looking back 40 years later, did the world end? No. But the result was greater public knowledge and a wider public perception of national public policy. It could therefore be challenged, debated and understood. The second reason given for an inquest to be held without a jury is the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country. From memory, this and the preceding reason appear in our Official Secrets Act. I remember from the debates that the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country was a contested matter. These matters are vital to everyone's interest—every citizen of this country and everyone who is concerned about public policy. These are considered greater interests than the ascertaining of the death of a person by the judgment of two people. The Secretary of State, or the Justice Minister, or the lord high panjandrum—he has so many responsibilities—puts the notion before a judge. The judge will determine what the public interest is, but many of us feel that it is for Parliament to decide what the public interest is in matters of this nature. The rule of law must be open and above board, preventing or detecting crime to protect the safety of a witness or another person, or preventing real harm to the public interest. This, however, is a whole bag that catches everything that is inconvenient—perhaps only that—to those who administer the state. As I said, I have been here a long time. There was a time when the attestation of a public interest immunity certificate, for instance, was almost an absolute assertion. One learned from the unravelling of the Scott inquiry that judges did not necessarily look behind the public interest immunity certificate; in fact, they quickly back-tracked. We are told that now judges take a determined interest in a public interest immunity certificate. However, there were all the arguments leading up to the Scott inquiry, which was about the standing of Britain—whether we had exported arms and whether the process had been correct. Scott's judgment was that two Cabinet Ministers had failed in their constitutional duty to keep the House informed. It may seem that I have wandered widely from what happens in a coroner's court. But a coroner's court is no less a part—and a very important part—of our freedom. It is a safeguard that ensures that the state cannot just override the inconvenience of someone's death or something that has happened to someone. It tells us the actual nature of what our real public policy is. That, I think, is why the provisions that I have been discussing are in the Bill. The Secretary of State's argument is that the interests of our country may not always coincide with the rule of law. We are talking about Executive, Crown appointees who use prerogative as the foundation—although much circumscribed by the House over time—through which there can be protection in respect of the inconvenience of the public, united, disagreeing with their judgment on what public policy should be. That is the tension that lies in secrecy about great matters. We are talking about the death of a citizen, and the reasons set out in the Bill are important. We should not take clause 11 or the processes that get us there lightly. Is it not better to know that when such a certificate is brought into place, it is open to real challenge? I have learned a new word: "gisting". I thought that "gist"—the "gist" of something—was only a noun. Just think about it: the "gist". That is not the facts.