Coroners and Justice Bill

We have heard something very important from the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell). As usual, he made his case strongly, but he also introduced a new term. We have heard of Thatcherism and Blairism: we now have Strawism. No doubt we will look back with fondness on this occasion on which it was first used. I am probably the only hon. Member here who has acted as a coroner. In my early days I was an assistant coroner. I was taught always to empanel a jury if the case was complicated or there was any possible involvement of the state or a public body, whether by negligence or act of omission or commission. My senior partner then—he is now the main coroner for the district—always believed that we had to shed the maximum amount of light on the evidence. The whole purpose of the coronial system is to discover what happened in relation to the death. Specifically, if there is the possibility of an act of omission or commission by an authority—be it the police or anyone else—it is vital that that happen. Over the years I have also acted as an advocate at inquests many times. After hearing all the evidence, the family leave the court able to reach the conclusion of the grieving process. In many cases, the grieving process remains open until the coroner's verdict or the jury's verdict has been delivered and the family knows, having heard all the evidence, what happened. To those of us who have not lost close family or other loved ones and who have not been through the process, it may sound difficult to believe, but I can assure the House that hearing all the evidence does very much assist in the grieving process. The right hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Frank Dobson) mentioned the issue of confidence, and that is the main building block of the coronial system. There are some good ideas in the Bill. Indeed, there are good and bad coroners, as there are good and bad in every walk of life. We must weed out the bad ones. The right hon. Gentleman said that PII certificates might not work because the judge might not grant them. That decision would be appealable, so it is unlikely that anyone would withdraw from the proceedings simply on that basis. Some 10 or 12 years ago, there was an arson campaign in Wales. Some of the individuals were caught and charged, and appeared before Caernarvon Crown court in north-west Wales. It was a unique case in that MI5 was heavily involved in tracking those guys down. MI5's evidence was redacted, gisted and subject to PII certificates, but the jury followed it adequately. Nobody—prosecutor or defence counsel—complained about the fairness of the proceedings. I suggest that that is one reason why we could look at the panoply of existing ways we could achieve justice. At that time, there was a fragile peace in Northern Ireland, and the identity of the MI5 agents had to be protected at all costs, because not to do so might have had fatal results. It worked, and nobody has ever complained about how that trial was conducted. Justice was achieved in that case. I am very concerned about clause 11(2), which refers to the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country. I mentioned in interventions that the deputy coroner for Oxfordshire has made many loud complaints about the inability of the US air force to deliver the videos of the fighter pilots unfortunately mistaking UK troops and dispatching them. The coroner was brave in raising those concerns in public, but I suspect that he did so because he was unable to get anywhere in private with the US authorities. His only avenue then was to make the issue public. I guess that his actions would be caught by this provision, and it would be enough for any Secretary of State to apply to minimise any embarrassment for the US. I am not casting aspersions on Ministers—it is not part of my function to do that—but clause 11(2) covers the "relationship" between the UK and another country. Embarrassing that other country would undermine the relationship, so that would be the effect of the wording, unless Ministers can tell me otherwise. Along with the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), I am a member of the Criminal Bar Association, and it was refreshing to hear the Secretary of State praying in aid that organisation. Far be it from me to suggest that he was desperate for support, but he certainly cited its opinions a lot, and fair play to him. We are fortunate to have an independent judiciary, and we are extremely fortunate that members of the High Court bench are prepared to tell the Government when they go wrong. That is refreshing, and it is how a democracy should work, with the separation of powers. If I have understood the process correctly, the Secretary of State will issue a certificate and the High Court judge will decide whether it should proceed. I suggest once again to the Secretary of State that the PII certificates work day in and day out in our courts—I mentioned the case at the Crown court in Caernarvon. Alongside that we have that other process we have heard about today of gisting—a wonderful word. It has been in the public domain before, but it has been very much in evidence today. Why not use that process too? The Jean Charles de Menezes inquest employed all those techniques, and it seemed to work all right. Have we not learned anything from that experience that can inform our approach? If we employ all the safeguards—the judge will undoubtedly have in mind the need to ensure a fair trial, that there is equality of arms and that both sides of any dispute are heard fully and properly—that inquest proves that we do not need this legislation. My greatest fear—I do not know whether it will apply to military inquests—is that there is no doubt that families will feel short-changed if they do not have the right, and I use that word advisedly, to have a jury trial in the coroner's court when there are these complicating features. Yes, that trial should apply all the safeguards because, as was said earlier, of course juries can leak. I would not want anybody's life to be imperilled by national security leaks—of course I would not—but as a lawyer I do not see the need for this provision, given that we have the existing provisions and just need somebody to pull them together. It is not beyond the wit of a High Court judge to do that easily and comfortably and to ensure fairness. A High Court judge has been appointed because he or she is probably at the top of the legal tree anyway—they are not there for any other reason—and they are there because they have very special qualities. Given that they have very special qualities, surely they could ensure that we could avoid using this particular provision. My biggest problem is that people will feel short-changed, hard done by or whatever phrase we want to use. Families will not feel that the matter has been heard properly, and I think that that is the worst possible thing that could happen. Given the reason why coroners' courts are convened and given the fact that families deserve to be told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, I believe that it is those families' common law right, as mentioned by the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore), to be entitled to have a jury hear their case. The hon. Member for Hendon, who is Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, referred to several things that the Committee had suggested in its concluding paragraphs—no fewer than nine, or maybe 11, suggestions that would add to the panoply of provisions that we already have. I think that this part of the Bill is flawed. I said that on Second Reading. I am as concerned now as I was then, and although I acknowledge, with great respect, that the Secretary of State and his team have moved in a certain direction, I think that the other place will make them move even further.