Coroners and Justice Bill

May I begin by thanking the Minister for her kind words about the way in which the Opposition have engaged with this Bill, and by joining my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) in sending good wishes for a speedy recovery to the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle), who cannot be here with us this evening? As with every plum duff, this Bill has some good points that persuade us—just—to allow it to pass through to the other place, where its more hopeless, useless and egregious provisions can be removed or amended. I want to remind the House of a passage from a Government Green Paper published yesterday, as it tells us a lot about how this Government think, and what motivates them in coming to this House with legislation. The passage is from paragraph 4.2 of "Rights and responsibilities: developing our constitutional framework", published yesterday by the Secretary of State. It reads as follows:""The possible range of approaches to a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities represents a continuum. At one end, it might take the form of a declaratory and symbolic statement. At the other lies a set of rights and responsibilities directly enforceable by the individual in the courts. Along the continuum there are options including some form of statement of principles which, endorsed by Parliament, might inform legislation—as well as public authority and court decisions—while not necessarily giving rise to enforceable individual rights. Ultimately, different categories of principles, rights and responsibilities could have different legal effects, so that a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities could encompass a range of legal effects and mechanisms for enforcement."" That is pretty vacuous, but if one were to substitute "Bill of Rights and Responsibilities" with "Coroners and Justice Bill", one would have an equally apt description of the vacuity behind much of the thinking that has created this Bill. We welcome the reform of the coronial system in part 1 of the Bill, subject to our deep concerns about the fact that clause 11 remains; we have no doubt that the other place will give that a thorough investigation. We also welcome other aspects of the Bill, outside part 1, that deal with anonymity in investigations. As I said in Committee, we take on board and fully understand the need for anonymity in the stages of investigation into many of the gangland attacks and offences that take place on the estates in our inner cities. We also welcomed the revival, if that is the correct expression, of the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 in respect of witness anonymity orders, which chapter 2—clause 70 and those following—provides for, subject to a number of matters of detail. We welcomed the measures on vulnerable and intimidated witnesses and the extension of live video links for the giving of evidence by vulnerable or frightened people. We have had discussions and disagreement this evening about the way in which the Sentencing Council will be required to arrive at conclusions and recommendations, and whether they should be followed or taken account of. However, as a matter of general principle, we do not object to the existence of a sentencing council; indeed, we have understood its positive features since 2003. We were prepared to welcome other matters, including those relating to the exploitation of criminal memoirs. We are not only disappointed with the content of some of the provisions on important subjects such as murder—the Government's refusal to accepts amendments to do with developmental maturity in cases involving diminished responsibility, and in respect of youngsters as well as adult killers—but we are deeply concerned about the way in which the Government have refused to remove the issue of sexual infidelity from the loss of control provisions in clauses 41 to 43. They deal with what used to be called provocation. The Bill has contained some good things, some less good things and some plainly dreadful things, one of which the Government did recognise through the withdrawal of what was clause 152 and what became clause 154. That was an appalling clause, but it was all of a piece with their attitude to individual rights and the relationship between the state and the citizen. Each time they come forward with a provision to increase the power of the state, to diminish the rights of the individual or to create some new criminal offence, they say that it is only a small reduction of liberty or a small new offence, but that it is strictly necessary in this particular case. When these things are looked at individually, they may not look too bad, but this is—