Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [HL]

moved, as an amendment to the Motion, Amendment No. 36A: "at end insert, ““but do propose Amendment Nos. 36B and 36C as consequential amendments to the Bill:" 36B: Page 52, line 27, at beginning insert ““Subject to subsections (3) and (4)”” 36C: Page 52, line 28, at end insert- ““(3) No order bringing sections 42 and 43 into force shall be made until after the publication of the results of an 18-month consultation with children and young people on the effects of these sections. (4) An order under subsection (3) shall not be made unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, both Houses of Parliament.”” The right reverend Prelate said: My Lords, Clauses 42 and 43 of the Bill were not debated on the Floor of the other place because of the shortage of time. In the final minutes of the remaining stages last Wednesday, it was said by the Member who tabled amendments to Clause 42 and 43: "““I am deeply saddened that we have not had a proper debate, and that there has not been a chance for every Member to go through one or other Division Lobby, on the issue””.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/10/08; col. 410.]" On Monday, the following letter appeared in the Daily Telegraph, setting down a challenge to this House: "““Sir—It is a sad reflection on the state of democracy in Britain that last Wednesday, without proper debate, the Government pushed through its highly controversial Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill (Letters, October 25) … There was no opportunity to debate the extraordinary proposals for deliberate creation of children with the intention they be denied a father for the duration of their childhood … we hope the Lords will do all it can to make good these failings””." It is signed by two Members of the other place. Given the lack of opportunity for scrutiny of Clauses 42 and 43, and attendant concerns that questions will be asked about our parliamentary process, I have been more than happy to table the amendment in my name that seeks to provide opportunity for greater scrutiny of these two clauses. I will first outline some of the problems of these provisions before focusing on the consultation proposed in my amendment. Currently, at the point of conception, every child has a chance of having a father as a parent during their childhood. I stress the word ““chance”” because there is no right to have a father than the law can guarantee. In this regard, there are at least two scenarios which we need to keep in view. First, disaster might strike; tragically, some fathers are killed before the birth of their children. Secondly, we must have regard for women who become pregnant either naturally or by IVF, with no immediate prospect of a present father who can input into the child’s life. At the point of conception, however, both have the chance of having a father because in the first instance, we do not know that the father will die, and in the second, the fact that a woman is not married or living with a partner when she becomes pregnant does not mean that it is intended that she will remain that way for the duration of the child’s childhood. She may marry at a later stage, and then the child would enjoy access to a social father for a period. While the law cannot guarantee a present father, it would surely be quite wrong, in my view, for the state to put in place a legal framework to allow for the deliberate creation of children with the intention that they should be denied the chance of ever having a father throughout their childhood, yet this is precisely the effect of the clauses before us. In making this point, I am keenly aware that some will say that with gay adoption legal, the point of principle has been conceded, and Clauses 42 and 43 simply outwork its implications in the context of IVF. This, however, is completely untrue. When a child is conceived who is later adopted by a lesbian couple, they have the chance of being parented by a father and may well have been parented by a father for a period. These children were not deliberately created with official sanction of the intention that they should be denied a father for the duration of childhood. While an argument can be made that despite the evidence suggesting the importance of fathers, it is better for children to be looked after by a loving same-sex family than for them to be in an institution, it is not appropriate—given the balance of research which clearly demonstrates the importance of fathers to the well-being of children as well as the importance of children’s rights— deliberately to create children with the intention that they should be denied a father for the duration of their childhood. When I was at school, we were told how bad things were for children in the 19th century. We were told how the upper classes suffered under a regime in which they were to be seen and not heard and how the lower classes were sent up chimneys and down mines. Since then, our teachers told us, things have improved, and in many ways they clearly have. But this legislation causes me big concerns. It shows a preoccupation with the rights of adults and would-be parents and loses sight of the importance of the rights of the child. In highlighting this point, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, who has prepared a legal opinion on the parenthood implications of the Bill. The opinion concludes that the changes proposed in the legislation, "““introduce an imbalance of human rights protections as between same-sex parents and the child. It is often said that in matters such as adoption, the best interests of the child are paramount. I do not see how the best interests of the child are served by the introduction of these changes””." Given the problems with Clauses 42 and 43, not least in relation to human rights, it seems only appropriate that we should pause before implementing these extremely controversial proposals. As well as revisiting the human rights arguments in light of the balance of current research about what is in the child’s best interests, I also think it is vital to listen to the views of children and young people specifically. It is interesting that the consultation process that went before the Bill—the 2005 review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act—managed to construe some key questions without even mentioning the child directly. Consider the following: "““The Government seeks views on whether the status and legal parenthood provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act should apply to same-sex couples who do not form a civil partnership. If so, how would automatic recognition of parenthood be achieved, given the lack of legal ties between the couple?””." It is almost as if the child were not there. The provision of an appropriate focused consultation exercise with children and young people would be entirely appropriate given the Government’s commitment to consult with children and young people in the Children’s Plan. Indeed, it seems to me that if the Government are to consult with children and young people on anything, they must surely talk to them about controversial proposals such as these which seek deliberately to create children with the intention that they be denied a father for the duration of their childhood and are vulnerable to the accusation that they have been developed out of regard for the interests of adults rather than children. I very much look forward to hearing the views of other Members of your Lordships' House on this important issue. I beg to move.