Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [HL]

My Lords, I should, first, thank the Minister and his colleagues for the further consideration that has been given to this matter since the Bill left this House for a somewhat prolonged sojourn in another place. Here it is back with us with an amendment in almost the same terms as the amendment that I originally proposed. When the draft Bill was before the committee examining it, it contained a catch-all clause after listing the four examples that remain in the Bill. Unfortunately, none of the experts that gave evidence to our committee could understand the clause. If they could not understand it, we thought that on the whole it was not adequate for the purpose of defining the entity that we had in mind. When the Bill ultimately came to your Lordships’ House, that portion had been deleted altogether, and in its place had been put a regulation-making power of somewhat ambiguous import. In other words, the Government had given up the idea that they could define in a catch-all way what they meant by this type of embryo. I felt, as did other noble Lords, that that was not satisfactory and we should do what we could to agree to a satisfactory catch-all definition that would not interfere with the four examples in the Bill, but demonstrate in essence their characteristics, as an explanation of the concept of an admixed human embryo. I should perhaps have mentioned that originally a different phrase was used. The phrase ““admixed human embryo”” was adopted during the passage of the Bill through this House. It is not a self-evident expression. An ordinary person will have some difficulty understanding the phrase. I believe—this may be the general view in the House—that it would be useful to produce what, in effect, is an explanation of the phrase at the same time as a catchall. There are a number of ways of approaching the matter. One is to say that everything that is not caught by the Home Office would be caught here, but unfortunately the approach of the Home Office in the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 is quite different: it concerned pain to animals. If human material is involved, there does not seem to be any particular criterion about the importance that that extra fact confers on the embryo. Therefore, here we have successfully defined the human end of the spectrum of mixture. It would be highly desirable for the rest of the spectrum to be looked at from the point of view of appropriate regulation. I do not think that the 1986 Act, which, after all, is a little elderly, is adequate to deal with the kind of considerations involved when less than 50 per cent human material is introduced into animals. Many people to whom I have spoken or who have spoken to me about the Bill did not know that such an end of the spectrum existed and has existed in practical terms for some time. The Government would do well to consider whether a different form of control or regulation is required at the other end of the spectrum. Perhaps because I had some part in framing this definition, I think it is entirely satisfactory. The use of the word ““predominant””, a word we hit on in the discussions to which the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, has referred with the eminent scientists who were willing to talk to us about it, is a general word which covers the whole period of an embryo's existence. Therefore, you look at whether the animal DNA is to predominate. If it does, it leaves this definition and, if not, it stays within it. My view is that the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Howe is not necessary. However, we discussed it before and it is important to raise it now so that the precise scope of the word ““predominate”” might be discussed at this stage which might help in any future matter which may arise in court or in some other way. I thank the Minister very much for what he has said. I certainly support government Amendment No. 3 and I say that Amendment No. 3A tabled by my noble friend is not necessary, although I believe this discussion is necessary.