European Union (Amendment) Bill

I support the amendment. Since I was first involved in European Union legislation—it was with the very first Bill, the European Communities Act 1972—I have applied a parliamentary sovereignty test to any such Bill that has come before us, including those relating to Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon. Although it sounds old-fashioned, I do not think that it is a bad test for any parliamentarian to apply. To what extent, if we agree to these treaty arrangements, will there be some concession of parliamentary sovereignty or, if one prefers the phrase, pooling of sovereignty? As the noble Lord, Lord Goodlad, pointed out, the evidence we received about the Lisbon treaty is that it is a major treaty that effects fundamental changes. It alters fundamentally the European architecture that emerged from Maastricht. It collapses one of the three pillars that emerged from Maastricht and brings the areas of justice and home affairs into the acquis communautaire, Commission-driven policy, ordinary procedure, QMV and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. Had this protocol not been in the treaty, I would not have been able to support the Bill, because the change to our constitution and issues of sovereignty is so fundamental. Fortunately, however, the Government have negotiated a protocol that represents some of the deepest red lines of their original negotiating position. The admirable analysis of the justice and home affairs area by the European Committee—dealing with opt-ins and opt-outs, past, present and future—demonstrates that the Government have achieved a very robust, comprehensive protocol, which has safeguarded not only the Executive’s position but that of parliamentary sovereignty. Because I attach such significance to the protocol—it is the reason I will be able to support the Bill—if, at any time, this or a future Government should seek to introduce or opt in to significant parts of the justice and home affairs area, as the protocol allows, express approval should be sought before doing so. We may assent to the Bill and therefore assent to the ratification of the treaty; future Governments may decide to opt in and surrender a degree of sovereignty as a result, but such action should be subject to express parliamentary approval. There are two specific reasons why that should be so. First, when the Government of the day negotiate an opt-in, they are not negotiating away their sovereignty in the process of negotiating away Parliament’s sovereignty. It is not just a question of an Executive action; the consequence of that Executive action is the surrender of parliamentary sovereignty as well as of Executive sovereignty. In that respect, I was somewhat surprised by my noble friend’s response to Question 2 in the European Committee’s evidence session when she said that she thought that final decisions and opt-ins rest with Ministers and the Executive. I know that they are Executive decisions, but surely they have to be subject to some kind of parliamentary debate and approval. We are not swapping royal prerogatives for Executive prerogatives. I do not think that one can say so baldly that this is for the Executive to decide and that Parliament does not have the right to seek approval. The second reason for accepting the principle behind the amendment is that, whether we like it or not, Parliament can do and undo things at will, as it were. But in practical political terms, once the Government opt in to any of these major measures, they opt in for good. It is a permanent and irrevocable decision. That is the second reason, along with that of parliamentary sovereignty, why I believe that such decisions should be subject to express parliamentary approval. My noble friend described vividly in a letter to the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, how Parliaments complicate and sometimes inconvenience ministerial negotiations. There are enough of us here to know that Parliaments can make life difficult for the Administrations of the day, even in the negotiating process. But that is a price worth paying for parliamentary democracy. Even if it does make life more complicated and issues of confidentiality arise, nevertheless, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodlad, said, parliamentary scrutiny and approval are an overriding priority. I was rather interested in an exchange in the European Union Committee where the noble Lord, Lord Kerr—I hope I am not going to put words in his mouth—suggested to my noble friend that there would not be an insuperable problem, that a UK Minister is talking to European-equivalent Ministers, all who come from parliamentary democracies. He or she should be able to explain the quirks of the UK parliamentary system or the difficulties that might arise. This is the reason therefore why fellow Ministers in the European Union should accommodate the need for a process of parliamentary approval, because others might have a very similar problem. I accept, however, that ours is unique because we are the only opting-in party. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, suggested in his question to my noble friend that from his own immense experience in negotiating in Brussels and Utrecht, it would not be very difficult to come to an arrangement with fellow European Ministers to ensure that, in the timescales concerned, we could build in this parliamentary approval procedure. He indicated that it would be in the interest of fellow European Ministers to accommodate the United Kingdom because they would want us to be opting-in at that stage. They should therefore be able to accommodate us in the issue of parliamentary approval. I gently suggest to my noble friend that the principles behind the amendment are in true keeping with the spirit and the thrust of the new constitutional renewal programme that the Government have embarked upon in the past six months. In my view, it is part and parcel of and very much in keeping and in tune with, the whole of the Government’s—I cheer them in this respect—constitutional renewal programme. After years of suffering a kind of executive phobia about the idea that Parliament might get involved in having to approve the waging of war, that problem has suddenly been overcome. As a result of the Government’s determination, we shall now have a parliamentary approval procedure for the waging of war. We will have the parliamentary approval procedure for the dissolution of Parliament and an enhanced parliamentary procedure for treaty making. It will be rather curious if we now suddenly decide that opt-ins, in the context of the European process, are somehow to be excluded from this concept of enhanced parliamentary responsibility, supervision and oversight. I therefore suggest to my noble friend that the principle behind the amendment is chiming with the whole of the Government’s view of constitutional renewal and, in particular, the right of Parliament to assert themselves on key issues such as those involved in opt-in. I strongly support the amendment.