European Union (Amendment) Bill

This debate has elicited contributions of staggering authority that I have felt privileged to listen to and that have almost compensated for missing the nicest day of the year outside. I assure the noble Baroness that being a novice in the establishment of British foreign policy is no bad thing—on the contrary, it could bring fresh light to a rather messy situation. I do not have time to answer all these superb insights. I am sorry that I shocked the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown, who has been so effective on the world stage. Of course we want a more effective foreign policy—any suggestion to the contrary would be ridiculous. The question concerns what kind of tools we use and how we use them in a constantly changing, sometimes near-anarchic international situation. Of course I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, that there are situations when it would be wonderful, indeed essential, to have a common 27-state agreed foreign policy going through all the procedures laid down in this treaty, and indeed other procedures as well. That is what we must work for. Call that ““collaboration”” if you like—call it ““co-operation””, call it ““intimate collaboration””. Certainly, let us do whatever we can and whatever is practical and prompt in the search for genuine consensus. As the noble Lord, Lord Owen, reminded us, let it be genuine and not a consensus that has to be agreed because the procedures so insist. The central question has been why, and to what extent, we need to be locked into a straitjacket from which, as we have heard, there may in some circumstances be no escape. That is the question rightly asked by the Government all through the negotiations on this and the previous, near-identical treaty. The Government have sought to answer it by trying to ensure that foreign policy is locked into the intergovernmental system—there it is in the Bill—and that our freedoms are protected; perhaps not all the time, but at least in the last resort. As my noble friend Lord Tugendhat said, in a very profound speech, we could face all kinds of unexpected situations—who knows? We are told nowadays that the fashionable phrase is ““black swans””—unexpected things that happen. Are we geared up and flexible enough to deal with these things, or have we tied ourselves down? That has been the debate and one is left with an uneasy feeling of uncertainty about the degree to which the Government have succeeded in these matters. We believe that we must maintain the distinction between, on the one hand, practical togetherness in common foreign policy—and flexibility about how we approach that togetherness—and, on the other hand, codified top-down procedures in a single legal pattern. That is the aim—that is what the Government were trying to do and that is what we believe is still in doubt in this treaty, despite all their efforts. At least let us close our discussion of this stage. We argue in Amendment No. 15A, for instance, which the noble Baroness mentioned, that the Secretary of State, before the coming into force of the treaty, should assure the House in a statement that, "““he will uphold the freedom of Her Majesty’s Government to undertake any action on the international scene that he perceives to be in the interests of the United Kingdom without consulting the European Council if he thinks that the security interests of the United Kingdom so require””." That is a very modest amendment. It is not a treaty-wrecker, so the Liberal Democrats need not worry. It is well within our powers to propose such an improvement and reassurance on this central issue of our sovereignty, direction, purpose and national identity. It is a modest amendment behind which lies a mighty principle. I would like to test the opinion of the House on Amendment No. 15A. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 13A. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. [Amendment No. 14 not moved.] [Amendment No. 15 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]