European Union (Amendment) Bill

I support Amendments Nos. 13A, 15A and 165. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, described these as ““wrecking amendments””. I make it clear that I support these ““wrecking amendments”” in a spirit of inquiry. In order to get answers to questions, it is necessary to have as wide a debate as possible. May I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, that his life is not about to end? I think that he will be able to witness his party, in opposition, repeating many of these arguments again and again in future. Eurosceptic I might be, but I have no problem with the idea of a common foreign policy, provided that it is based on genuine, shared interest. It seems absolutely natural that people who are geographical neighbours, countries of the same land mass, are bound to develop common concerns in foreign policy and in defence. I have always felt that, within the European Union, co-operation both on foreign affairs and defence is right, provided that it does not cut across our relations with the United States which, realistically, will provide much of the defence equipment and the support we need. However, the assumption that our interests will always converge is only that—an assumption. So is the wonderfully rhetorical phrase ““ever-increasing convergence”” of interests. They will not necessarily converge. For that reason, I suggest that a common foreign policy should not be a straitjacket, because there are likely to continue to be differences between us and our neighbours. That is why I support Amendment No. 15A, which concerns that part of the treaty that says we should consult before taking any action that could conflict with EU interests. The great hesitation that I have about an EU common foreign policy is that it seems that so often an EU foreign policy is just rhetoric; it is so often just the lowest common denominator. A very good example of that happened the other day, when the Foreign Secretary made an announcement about Kosovo in the House of Commons, which he called an EU initiative. I have no doubt that the EU is doing certain things—I know that it is—in terms of offices, financial help and preparation with the relationship between Kosovo and the EU, but to call it a great initiative and advance in foreign policy, when there is a profound division within the EU about whether one should even recognise Kosovo, seems to be ignoring reality. A number of countries in the EU will not recognise Kosovo, including important countries such as Spain. Iraq was another example of where there was absolutely no agreement within the EU; I am told that Iraq was hardly discussed at a formal EU level. Perhaps if there had been a common foreign policy we would have been constrained and would have avoided a very ghastly mistake, but I would not want to constrain our action for that reason and that reason alone. It seems to me that EU foreign policy is too obsessed with process rather than substance and that it would be far better to concentrate on implementing what we have got rather than always building new structures. It is right that we should examine those structures, and it is right that there should be wrecking amendments, as the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, called them, to find out just how constrained our foreign policy is or is not. As my noble friend Lord Howell said, it is important that foreign policy should not be justiciable and that it should be decided on a unanimous basis; I very much welcome Article 10C and what it says about that. Then you have the areas, as my noble friend Lord Howell pointed out, where the ECJ can adjudicate between the CFSP and external policy. There must be some doubt about that, because the Government got a declaration about foreign policy into the treaty, showing that—as in other areas such as the European Charter of Fundamental Rights—they are saying, ““Oh, this is fine, this is watertight, this is absolutely secure; but just in case it is not, we also have a declaration””. I think that we are right to pursue these things. How is the office of the high representative different in substance from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs in the constitutional treaty, which Mr Hain was very keen should not happen? He did not want there to be two posts, one for external affairs and one for foreign affairs, but they were merged in this treaty. The high representative will chair the foreign affairs council, even though he is a member of the Commission. That was something that Mrs Beckett tried to take out of the treaty at the last minute at Lisbon, and yet it is there. Why is that important? Surely it is just a minor point. Not at all, because to some extent it compromises the pillared approach that was in Maastricht; the approach that said that foreign affairs ought to be intergovernmental. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, said that we on this side seem to be forgetting our enthusiasm for intergovernmental co-operation; not at all. Our amendments are tabled precisely because this treaty appears to take us a little bit away from intergovernmental co-operation to something that is much more supranational. Then there is the relationship between the high representative and QMV. I know that we have a separate batch of amendments coming up on that, which I will not talk about. Article 31 of the consolidated treaty lists a whole series of areas where QMV could come into being. There are the passerelle clauses. There is also the provision under the treaty whereby, if the Council unanimously asks the high representative to frame a policy proposal, that proposal can be subject to QMV. You can ask, ““What is wrong with that; it is initially by unanimity, but it later becomes QMV?””. That means that a Government have to take a position early on in the process on whether something is in the national interest. One can easily envisage circumstances in which a view might change as a situation in the world develops. Lastly, I strongly support what my noble friend Lady Park said about the external—I nearly said eternal—action service. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, referred to the usefulness that it could have in countries where Britain was not represented, but it will not exist just in countries where Britain is not represented. As my noble friend said, in many countries there are already lavish EU embassies. That is how they are regarded; the heads of mission have diplomatic status. It is not so long ago—and I shall not embarrass him—that I was in one major Asian country where late at night the ambassador sat me down, gave me a whisky, and said, ““Could you explain what on earth the EU embassy is doing here? Does it protect British citizens when arrested? Is it promoting British trade? Does it help people following some natural disaster? What is it and all its staff doing?””. There is already ridiculous duplication. There is not enough focus on the external representation that the EU already has with the many offices—even those for small business creation—all over the world in countries such as India. This is among the most lavish provisions that are wholly unnecessary. That is not the main point that I support in the amendment. The main points are those that probe whether the treaty is as watertight as the Government maintain. That is difficult to believe when they worked so hard at the convention and late at Lisbon to take out provisions that now remain in it.