European Union (Amendment) Bill

The noble Lord must have suffered untypically from a momentary lapse in concentration, because I just told the Chamber about just one of the features that categorically and irreversibly makes a difference between the amending treaty, which is currently under consideration, and the constitutional proposal that was previously before Europe until it was killed off by the electorates of the Netherlands and France. For the record—this may permit me not to have to cover the same ground again and again in the days stretching out before us, although I live more in hope than in expectation on that point—I never favoured the necessary amendments to the procedures, practices and systems of the enlarged Union being called or supported as a constitution. The noble Lord, Lord Patten, was here earlier. I am certain that he would bear testimony to the fact that in the European Commission when we considered these matters with the two representatives that we had on the so-called convention, I repeatedly made the point—to his credit, he made similar points—that since what was being proposed, despite the grandiose terminology of Giscard D’Estaing, did not alter the way in which any of the democracies of the European Union were to be governed, it could not therefore justifiably be called a constitution. I continue to insist on that valid point and I had some pleasure in putting it directly to Giscard D’Estaing when we had the opportunity to discuss these matters. I should like to make another brief point, which is connected to my former point. Publicly, repeatedly, and sometimes in contradiction of the leadership of my party, I made it very clear, well before the 2005 general election and the compilation of the manifesto as well as after, that since what was being proposed could not be regarded justifiably as constitutional, it did not in this parliamentary democracy warrant a referendum. We can discuss the merits of referendum, but I am certain that noble Lords who have said that Members on the other side are pursuing a political line are correct. However, it would be implausible—indeed, impossible—for this House or any House of Parliament to try to avoid being political in its argument, so I do not quarrel with the right of Members opposite to offer political arguments. I echo the view of my noble friend earlier who rued the fact that words such as ““lying”” and ““deceit”” were used, but it is up to the people who use them to decide whether they adorn or undermine the force of their argument. I leave that entirely to noble Lords opposite. If it is argued now that on this treaty there should be a referendum, and that the final judgment on this treaty should be taken away from Parliament and be made the subject of plebiscite, where does that stop? If the answer cannot be offered as to where it stops, what issues are fit to be determined by Parliament and what issues are of such concern and such status as not to be considered by and determined by Parliament, where does it stop? Until that question is convincingly answered—not conveniently answered—at least we shall know who put the ““dum”” in referendum.