Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill

My Lords, I hope that in making my observations about the noble Lord’s amendment I paid due tribute to the spirit that lay behind it. We are dealing with a sentencing system. Although welfare should infect every part of the youth justice system, for the purposes of this Bill the crucial institution is the court. Therefore, the judges must be absolutely clear what obligations lie on their shoulders, which is why I made my observations about the importance of having someone specific. I am sure, again, that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, with his experience in another existence, would agree that personal responsibility above all is central. I believe that it is central that the Bill, because it is about sentencing, points to the sentencing authority, which is what Amendments Nos. 36 and 37 do. My other concern about Clause 9 lies in the purposes subsection. As I think I observed in Committee, there is nothing to distinguish the purposes of sentencing under Clause 9, which are referred to in proposed new subsection (2)(c), from the purposes of sentencing adults. I do not know whether at this stage the Minister would care to look at that again, but it underlies many of the observations made by many of your Lordships. I pick out again the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, only because, in Committee, she led the debate on this issue. Time and again, she has been at pains to say that children are different from adults. Therefore, it is very difficult to talk about the purposes of sentencing for children in a way that is identical to the purposes of sentencing for adults. I would very much like the Minister to say something about that. Having made those observations, I should like once again to congratulate the Minister on making—given the rhetoric of the Government in another place—a remarkable advance in sympathetic thinking on this most important matter of all in our justice system.