Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill

moved Amendment No. 36: 36: Clause 9, page 7, leave out lines 1 to 9 and insert— ““(2) The court must have regard to— (a) the principal aim of the youth justice system (which is to prevent offending (or re-offending) by persons aged under 18: see section 37(1) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998), (b) in accordance with section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, the welfare of the offender, and (c) the purposes of sentencing mentioned in subsection (4) (so far as it is not required to do so by paragraph (a)).”” The noble Lord said: My Lords, we have had substantial and helpful debate, both in this House and in another place, on Clause 9, which sets out the purposes of sentencing for under-18s. The debate on Clause 9 has encapsulated much of our informed debate about the purpose and outcome of the youth justice system as a whole. Clause 9 is designed to clarify the current law and to remove a potential source of confusion for sentencers. It has been strongly welcomed by the Youth Justice Board and the Magistrates’ Association. It will, of course, underpin and inform the new community sentencing structure with its emphasis on rehabilitation and tailored interventions. It is very important that we get this clause right. As drafted, the Bill states that when sentencing a young person the court must have regard primarily to the principal aim of the youth justice system, which is to prevent offending or reoffending by persons under the age of 18. The court should also have regard to the purposes of sentencing, as set out in subsection (4), and to the welfare of the offender in accordance with Section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. Many noble Lords took the opportunity to speak to this clause in Committee and some expressed concerns that a hierarchy was built into it. Many felt that the welfare of the child was subordinate in the clause, a point that the Joint Committee on Human Rights made explicitly. We have listened carefully to noble Lords; the group of amendments that I have tabled reflects that fact. We believe that our amendments are compatible with our international obligations under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The amendments will, I hope, remove any argument about a hierarchy within the purposes of sentencing. Essentially, the court will have to have equal regard to the principal aim of the youth justice system, the welfare of the young person and the purposes of sentencing. I believe that the amendments clarify the position. I hope that they will reassure noble Lords that we do not believe that the welfare of the child should be a subordinate consideration. I am happy to make it clear that the welfare of the offender is a primary consideration and must be considered by the court as such. I beg to move.