Animals Act 1971 (Amendment) Bill

Thank you for rescuing me, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I could see myself getting into somewhat hot water over the nature of a ferret. The Animals Act is well analysed in the 17th edition of ““Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort””. The authors particularly raise the scienter principle—you have said that I cannot go into that in detail, Mr. Deputy Speaker, so I will not—and examine the range of animals to which section 2(2) of the Animals Act applies. While I might not know the position in relation to ferrets, I certainly do in relation to dogs. The question is whether we are looking at all dogs, as a generic animal, or individual dogs of particular species and, ultimately, breeds. I am pleased that case law has looked at dogs with reference to their breeds. ““Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort”” says—this is relevant in relation to injuries—that Alsatians are powerful dogs and that if a member of that breed bites someone, it is likely that the injury will be severe. It says that it is unnecessary to say that a particular Alsatian is especially large or has unusually big teeth. What matters is not whether the injury is severe, but the propensity within the definitions in section 2. There is also a question of likelihood, and what is meant by likely. An interesting example was given by Lord Scott in Mirvahedy itself. He said that one might break one's neck by falling down stairs after tripping over an escaped pet dormouse, but that no one would suggest that a dormouse was likely to cause death or injury. On the other hand, it is probable that the requirement would be satisfied if horses were to escape on to a busy motor road, as happened in the Mirvahedy case. Mirvahedy is the particular problem here, and the learned authors of ““Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort”” have examined it. They summarise clearly the ratio in the Mirvahedy case. They say:"““Horses are not normally in a state of mindless panic but they will be when they are frightened and, for the majority of the House of Lords, their being frightened was 'particular circumstances' for the purposes of the second limb””" of the test."““The rival, unsuccessful interpretation,””—" for which the hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire contends—"““that the 'second limb' is not an alternative basis of liability but merely explains the basic requirement of abnormality by recognising that in some circumstances even placid animals will react dangerously is less consistent with the statutory wording””." That is the point. Ultimately we come back to looking at the wording of the statute, and that is where the point that I made earlier arises. They go on to say:"““Suppose the horse had got over its panic at being lost and suddenly stopped still in the middle of the highway and was hit by the claimant's car. Is the accident now attributable to any characteristic of the horse for the purposes of section 2(2)?””" The answer to that has to be no. That summarises where we are in relation to that part of section 2. We must then look at section 2 and its interrelationship with the definition of ““dangerous wild animal””, which is the point raised by my hon. Friend: what sort of animal comes within section 2(2) and what sort of animal comes within section 2(1)? Again, I turn to the authors of ““Winfield and Jolowitz on Tort””, who give great assistance here. They say:"““A dangerous species is defined as: 'a species (a) which is not commonly domesticated in the British Islands and (b) whose fully grown animals normally have such characteristics that they are likely, unless restrained, to cause severe damage or that any damage they may cause is likely to be severe.'””" They give the examples of the elephant, which we talked about earlier, in the Bertram Mills' circus, a lion and certain types of monkey. The problem is that we know an elephant when we see it, but the broad definition is somewhat difficult to follow. I think that everyone remembers the Chipperfield circus case when Dorothy Tutin was put in a camel race and fell off. One of the arguments there was whether the camel was a wild animal within the terms of section 2 of the Animals Act. The conclusion was that it was, even though it was a domesticated camel, perhaps in the same way that the elephant was, and that the circus was strictly liable under the first part of section 2 of that Act. Life would be made a lot easier if the test in the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976, which sets out sensibly and clearly what is or is not a dangerous wild animal, was included in section 2.