Animals Act 1971 (Amendment) Bill

The fact remains, to finish the point about insurance that my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North raised earlier, provision for compulsory insurance is already in place in certain circumstances. Chapter 70 of the Riding Establishments Act 1964 makes it a requirement for riding schools. Section 1(4A)(d) makes it absolutely clear that"““the licence holder shall hold a current insurance policy which insures him against liability for any injury sustained by those who hire a horse from him for riding and those who use a horse in the course of receiving from him, in return for payment, instruction in riding and arising out of the hire or use of a horse as aforesaid and which also insures such persons in respect of any liability which may be incurred by them in respect of injury to any person caused by, or arising out of, the hire or use of a horse as aforesaid””." Thus, there is already a requirement for compulsory insurance in the horse industry—a point I put to the hon. Member for Leominster, who was clearly not aware of the Riding Establishments Act 1964. Although that requirement for comprehensive insurance dates from the 1960s, it was reinstated in the Riding Establishments Act 1970, which made provision in similar terms, so there is nothing novel in my argument that there should be compulsory insurance for animal ownership. It goes back to 1964—before the 1967 Law Commission inquiry, before the Animals Act 1971 and before the Riding Establishments Act 1970, which also predates the 1971 Act. What I propose in that respect is nothing new. Where does that take us? The Library briefing summarises the position simply:"““The Bill aims to narrow the number of situations…when an owner of an animal will be strictly liable (that is liable for compensation to an injured party regardless of whether there is any fault on the owner's part) following an accident involving the animal.””" The Mirvahedy case puts the point rather clearly and throws the question squarely upon us. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, who made the lead judgment in the Mirvahedy case, put it this way:"““The appeal raises one question: is the keeper of an animal such as a horse strictly liable for damage caused by the animal when the animal's behaviour in the circumstances was in no way abnormal for an animal of the species in those circumstances?""Lest there be any misunderstanding one point should be clarified at the outset. Considered as a matter of social policy, there are arguments in favour of answering this question yes, and arguments in favour of answering no. It may be said that the loss should fall on the person who chooses to keep an animal which is known to be dangerous in some circumstances. He is aware of the risks involved, and he should bear the risks.””" That is my case. Lord Nicholls continued:"““On the other hand, it can be said that, negligence apart, everyone must take the risks associated with the ordinary characteristics of animals commonly kept in this country. These risks are part of the normal give and take of life in this country.””" That is the argument of the hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire, and that is what his Bill would achieve. Those paragraphs from Lord Nicholls's judgment fairly and squarely put the difference between us in the House today. Lord Nicholls goes on to say:"““These considerations, and other arguments of this nature, are matters for Parliament. They are not matters for this House acting in its judicial capacity. It is not for the courts to form a view on which of these arguments seems the more weighty when Parliament has already carried out this exercise. Parliament must be taken to have weighed the various factors, and balanced the conflicting interests of those who keep animals and those who are injured by them, when enacting the Animals Act 1971. The answer to the question I have posed lies in interpreting the provisions of this Act, and in particular section 2(2), in accordance with established principles of statutory interpretation.””" Applying those principles, Lord Nicholls and the majority in the Mirvahedy case—we have heard a lot about the minority—came to the conclusion that, in those circumstances, Mr. Mirvahedy should be compensated, and I agree with Lord Nicholls. The majority in the House of Lords agreed with him as well. The basic principle set out in the Mirvahedy judgment is clear, but the issue is not new. It has been troubling society since biblical times, believe it or not. If we look at Exodus—[Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North perks up. There is provision in Exodus. That is important because it is the origin of the scienter principle, which goes to the root of today's debate. The scienter principle was overturned by the 1971 Act and replaced by section 2(2)(b). It is to do with the extent to which somebody knows or does not know what their animal is likely to do. My hon. Friend is now looking at me with anticipation. If he wants the references, they are Exodus 21, 28-30 and 35-6.