Animals Act 1971 (Amendment) Bill

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that helpful intervention. The opaque language of section 2(2) of the 1971 Act has been widely criticised. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, in his 2003 judgment, stated:"““there has been a difference of judicial opinion. This difference of view exists also in your Lordships' House… In common with all other judges who have had to wrestle with this question, I have found that the tortuous language of section 2(2)(b) renders its intended meaning peculiarly difficult to ascertain. I readily acknowledge that my mind has fluctuated between the two interpretations.””" It might be helpful if I explain the legal background in a little more detail. Section 2(2) of the 1971 Act focuses on the damage caused by non-dangerous animals, but does so in an unfortunately complex way. It places strict liability on the keepers of non-dangerous animals that cause harm, assuming that three requirements are satisfied. The first requirement is:"““the damage is of a kind which the animal, unless restrained, was likely to cause or which, if caused by the animal, was likely to be severe””." The second requirement, which is crucial to this discussion, is:"““the likelihood of the damage or of its being severe was due to characteristics of the animal which are not normally found in animals of the same species or are not normally so found except at peculiar times or in particular circumstances””." The third requirement is:"““those characteristics were known to that keeper””." Although the first and third points are clear and non-controversial, it is perhaps unsurprising that the courts have struggled to understand the language of that second requirement. My Bill would address precisely that problem. In the Mirvahedy case, the court had to judge whether the provision referred only to a particular dangerous animal, or whether it could also refer to a perfectly normal animal that just happened to display dangerous characteristics typical of a species at a particular time or in particular circumstances, whether predictable or not. Clearly, the latter interpretation broadens the scope of the requirement, and in Mirvahedy v. Henley that was the side that their lordships ultimately chose. It is important to understand the details of the case that led to this landmark ruling. Horses belonging to the Henleys were spooked. Although they had been securely fenced in, they were so scared that they managed to break through the fences. They ran for a mile before coming to the road along which Mr. Mirvahedy was driving and collided with his car, tragically causing him serious injuries. At no stage was there any question that the Henleys had been in any way negligent. The case was initially found in favour of the Henleys, but once it was taken on appeal under the Animals Act 1971, the Henleys were found liable to pay for the harm caused, although they had not been negligent and were powerless to prevent their horses from getting spooked and breaking out. Given the seriousness of Mr. Mirvahedy's injuries, he was entitled to compensation. The legal case was thus fought out between his insurers and those of the Henleys to determine which insurance company would pay. However, the fact that the judgment was found against the Henleys has had severe consequences for those in the equine industry, because of the subsequent rise in insurance premiums.