London Underground

That might well be so. It is difficult to interpret the position differently. But if that was the way in which public money was being spent, it suggests an improper use of public money—and certainly an unwise and ineffectual one, given how matters turned out. A contract that was designed to last for 30 years lasted only four years before collapsing. That is a terrible racket. When the Secretary of State gave evidence to the Committee on 7 November, she said:"““There are always going to be costs in trying to get best value for money for the taxpayer.””" That is a curious statement. It suggests that getting best value for money for the taxpayer means spending lots of other money. It is a strange way of justifying what was a financial disaster for the Government, for the taxpayer and, I am afraid, for the people of London. I hope that the Government will learn lessons from this. There are lessons about the micro-management of train matters that they need to take on board. According to an article by Christian Wolmar, Ministers are about to make the same mistake with replacements for high-speed trains on the national rail network. He wrote:"““Instead of a simple purchasing exercise, the Department for Transport is trying to be very clever and wants bids from consortiums involving train manufacturers and finance houses in a 30-year PPP scheme.””" Have we heard that before somewhere? According to those in the rail industry to whom I have spoken, the cost of the new high-speed trains on the east coast line will be well above what it should be as a consequence of the process in which the Department for Transport is involved. So look out, perhaps, for excessively priced trains on the high-speed east coast line come 2012-13. This PPP contract is difficult to defend in any way. It did reward contractors for moving toilets nearer to the driver's cabs at the end of the line so that they took less time going to the loo. That is, perhaps, one positive aspect that I have managed to find from reading through the PPP contract. It might have saved a couple of quid here and there by that move—or perhaps not when the cost of moving the loos is taken into account. The micro-management in the contract is such that it specifies such matters, yet it is unable to deal at all with the big questions about who Metronet gets its business from, why there were cost-plus contracts, and what would happen if it went into liquidation, which then occurred. No thought was given to that prospect by those who ratcheted up £500 million in bills for the taxpayer in order to give advice—but we did have advice about how near driver's cabs should be to toilets at the end of platforms. The Government need to learn many lessons from this, such as how to run their railway policy, not to micro-manage, and not to look at PPP through rose-tinted spectacles and to understand that it might have a role to play but it will not necessarily be the best option for the taxpayer. They also need to be more open about their own mistakes in 1998 and beyond.