European Union (Amendment) Bill

I must proceed for another few minutes. The Government cannot argue that the treaty is different and that the referendum is unnecessary because they have met their four red lines, which relates to the point that the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton has just made. One of the red lines was that the treaty should have no impact on tax policy. The fact that the impact on tax is the same in the treaty as it was in the constitution is clear—there is no impact at all. It was only ever a red herring that Tony Blair invented when he was before the Liaison Committee. The second red line is that there should be no loss of independence in foreign policy—that can be debated in respect of either document—but other than the renaming of the foreign minister as the high representative, almost nothing has changed between the two documents. A third red line—claimed by Tony Blair at the Dispatch Box in front of me at the end of June in his last days in office—was a clear opt-out from the charter of fundamental rights, but the Minister for Europe has since told us:"““The fact is that the United Kingdom has neither sought nor achieved an opt-out on the charter of fundamental rights, which will apply in every member state of the European Union.””—[Official Report, 28 January 2008; Vol. 471, c. 34.]" That is a total reversal of what the former Prime Minister said, and he is no longer here to explain that to the House of Commons. The final red line was the opt-in on justice and home affairs. The value of that has been debated, and the European Scrutiny Committee has cast doubts on parts of it. The Government claim to have met their red lines, although few objective analysts agree with them, but when they promised a referendum they made exactly the same claim about their red lines. So, what has really changed between Tony Blair standing at the Dispatch Box and saying"““let the battle be joined.””—[Official Report, 20 April 2004; Vol. 420, c. 157.]" about a referendum in April 2004, and the current Prime Minister saying, ““Let battle be avoided at any cost, and please don’t let me be photographed at the signing ceremony””? Only two things have changed: the general election of 2005 was got out of the way, and the Government decided that a referendum could not be held because they did not think that they would win it. The Prime Minister who did not have the bottle to call a general election he had prepared for is the same Prime Minister who does not have the courage or honour to hold a referendum that he has promised. As a result, this treaty is devoid of any democratic mandate or legitimacy, which is a rarity in the history of European treaties. The authority of the Wilson Government in the ’60s to pursue entry negotiations into the then European Economic Community derived from a clear commitment in their election manifesto. The mandate of the Conservative Government elected in 1970 to complete those entry negotiations was based on an explicit manifesto commitment. The Labour Government elected in 1974 said that they would hold a referendum, and they did. The Conservative manifesto in 1992 included the intention to ratify the treaty of Maastricht. However, nowhere did the Labour manifesto of 2005 say that if the constitution were defeated elsewhere in Europe, it would be brought back with a few tweaks or that a commitment to a British referendum would be abandoned. The opportunity to call a general election last autumn, with the ratification of the treaty proposed in the Government’s manifesto, was not taken up. Given that the treaty brings about major changes in the way in which Britain is governed, the Government have nowhere—neither in a general election nor in a referendum—requested or received the authority and consent of the people. The absence of such authority damages the democratic legitimacy of the European Union in the eyes of the electorate. The unwillingness of those who favour a treaty of this kind to submit their views to the electorate contributes neither to democracy nor to the quality of argument. In a speech last month to the Centre for European Reform, the Foreign Secretary was reported to have said that once the new EU treaty had been ratified, pro-Europeans in Britain, as he termed them, would have no more excuses in trying to combat public hostility to the EU. The implication is that, once the treaty is ratified without the voters’ consent, Ministers must start working on the voters in order to encourage them to favour such things. What is wrong with trying to persuade the voters of the merits of the case before ratification, rather than afterwards? What does it say about the convictions of politicians when they reserve their arguments for following quietly in the wake of decisions, rather than arguing boldly for them in advance? It tells us that their calculations are more important than their convictions. As one commentator wrote yesterday in The Independent:"““This treaty strategy is Gordon Brown’s personal creation, this is his specified treatment of Parliament, and visible to all is his definition of politics as cynicism in action.””"