Treaty of Lisbon (No. 5)

I must have that discussion with the right hon. Gentleman, too, because one of the problems that has bedevilled the European Union is that its enthusiasts and its critics resort to hyperbole on almost every possible occasion, thereby damaging both sides of the argument and confusing the British public. That must be borne in mind. As one tries to work out the claims and counter-claims about the treaty, the British public are entitled to know whether it will fundamentally impede the pursuit of our foreign policy. It is reasonable to ask whether, if the powers had been available in the past 10 years, any of the most fundamental matters on which British policy diverged from that of most of our European colleagues would have been affected. Rightly or wrongly, we went to war over Iraq. Britain would not have been prevented from carrying out that policy if any of the powers had been in force at the time. Policy on Kosovo divided Europe 10 years ago as it does today, but Britain was not impeded from making its judgment about what the national interest justified. Although we have differences with European colleagues about Afghanistan, our policy would not be impeded if the powers existed. It is important to make that point, or we confuse our electorate, whichever side of the argument we choose to present. However, my comments are valid only if the Government are frank about not only the European Union's achievements but its failures on foreign policy. Kosovo is highly relevant in that context. Nine years ago, we had agreement, not on going to war but at least on the objective of restoring autonomy to Kosovo. That was the purpose of European policy. The then Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, was clear about the matter. He said that, after the war in Kosovo,"““nearly everybody inside Kosovo wants independence and absolutely everybody outside Kosovo does not””." President Clinton said on behalf of the United States that he believed that ““autonomy not independence”” was required and that"““independence could actually spur more instability””." That was effectively the basis on which the United Kingdom went to war. I therefore find it unimpressive that the Foreign Secretary spoke this week about a common European position, Europe realising its ideals and Europe working positively, when the emergence of Kosovan independence destroyed the whole basis on which this country entered into combat. I want to make a couple of other comments about Kosovo and relate them to whether there should be a common foreign and security policy. There is a fundamental difference between a single and a common foreign and security policy. We all know that there will not be a single foreign policy for many generations to come, if ever. However, a common foreign policy is different. Let us assume that the European Union did not exist and that we were not constrained in any way by the EU or its institutions. Notwithstanding that, it would be highly desirable for the countries of Europe to try to find common positions if there was genuine and substantive agreement—not artificial agreement—between them. Whether it was on the middle east, Zimbabwe, Iran, Russia or energy policy, it would be highly desirable, from the point of view of the United Kingdom's national interest, to have allies with whom we could work and present a common position if we were to influence the US, Russia and other parts of the world. I have no doubt about that, but there are two important caveats if we wish to pursue a common foreign policy. The first is obvious: it must be based on unanimity and not on any form of qualified majority voting, not only because that is undesirable in principle and would conflict with our national sovereignty—vital though those points are—but because it would not work. One cannot force a country to pursue a foreign policy that is contrary to its perception of its national interest. The French, the Germans, the Spanish and the Cypriots will not do it, any more than the UK would do it. That goes without saying. The second point has not yet been made today and it is important. If the Government rightly want to advance common foreign policy, they must do that only when there is agreement on substance, not simply on form. There has been a tendency, not only under this Government but for many years, to go for the lowest common denominator in Europe so that the European Union can say, ““We have a common position.”” We end up with documents, statements and policies that do not add up to a row of beans because they constitute an attempt to create a spurious unity. I fear that the Foreign Secretary's statement yesterday on Kosovo falls in that category. We all know that Europe is deeply divided about Kosovo. We may disagree about the proportions and how many countries will ultimately recognise Kosovo's independence. However, today almost half the European Union refuses to recognise Kosovo's independence. A statement was produced, and our Foreign Secretary said,"““What you've seen here is clear political leadership from the European Union””." Would not it have been more sensible for the Foreign Secretary to say, ““It is disturbing and sad that Europe is deeply divided on this issue, but we've at least established some points of agreement, and we might build on that in the future””? That would correspond to reality. However, instead he fell into the trap that catches people on both sides of the argument: anything European has to be 100 per cent. correct or totally wrong. Consequently, the national interest is not well served.