Treaty of Lisbon (No. 5)

The hon. Gentleman will have to wait and see how we vote on the night. However, what is interesting—[Interruption.] One of the interesting things in the treaty in respect of EU developments and procedures is the proposal for constructive abstention; I think that that is a very good idea. Let us look at the problems of EU foreign and security policy and at the reforms and their benefits more closely. First, there has been the problem that responsibility for driving the EU debates on foreign policy was divided between three people—the holder of the current post of high representative, the Commissioner for External Relations and the six-monthly rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers. Does anyone seriously wish to defend that system? It was confusing enough for Europeans, let alone others from the US or China who wanted to talk to a genuine voice. The new arrangement is not without its problems; the new president of the Council may try to usurp some status from the newly titled EU high representative, for example. However, when member states collectively and unanimously decide a position, they can now at least entrust the implementation of that decision to a more permanent, professional and coherent bureaucracy—and therefore hold it to account far more effectively. There was the crazy problem that the policy levers of sticks and carrots—mainly through aid and trade arrangements—were under the Commission and not readily available to the high representative. That created delays even when there was strong political will and consensus. Quick, effective decision making can be essential during crises and the new arrangements give EU Ministers, acting unanimously, the sporting chance of achieving that more easily. There was also the bizarre situation of the high representative not controlling the Commission's delegations to non-member states, often having to rely on the embassies of whichever country held the presidency for that six months. It was a real hit and miss affair. The European external action service, although largely a rebranding of existing EU delegations and offices, once again has the potential to assist the new EU high representative and ensure that the operations are fit for purpose for an integrated EU foreign policy. We could, of course, talk about many other changes, although I believe that they are even less controversial or substantial. Other speakers have touched on them. I am thinking, for example, of the extension of the operational remit of the EU in common security and defence policy, to take on all the so-called Petersberg tasks—for example, humanitarian and rescue tasks and crisis management, including peacekeeping and conflict prevention. There is also the extension of qualified majority voting in some aspects of the implementation of foreign and common security policy decisions, themselves taken by unanimity. However, as the Foreign Secretary said, that is not in itself novel to the treaties. Then there is the new article on the United Nations Security Council, which so perturbed the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks. The dramatic, the amazing, the quite extraordinary change that that treaty amendment makes is to ensure that when France and Britain have already agreed with our other 25 partners in the EU on a common position, we should, as a matter of course, always ask the Security Council whether the high representative can present the EU's common position. Does that ““revolution”” mean that Britain will have to stay silent? No. Will it mean that we forfeit our right to vote? No. Will we be excluded from all the back-room, corridor dealings that inevitably precede a meeting of the Security Council? No. It simply means that a policy position that we support gets presented again, with the force of a spokesman who represents 27 member states—only modern-day Conservatives would oppose that minor change that is in our national interest.