Treaty of Lisbon (No. 4)

If Members will allow me, I shall deal with this specific point in detail shortly. The constitutional treaty, like the budget and the rebate before it, has involved a process in which the Government have through their own words and deeds showed that they understand full well where the lines needed to be drawn. They recognised precisely where Britain's vital interest lay. As with the budget negotiation, however, faced with defeat at the negotiating table, instead of digging in and using the veto—which is there precisely to defend our national interest—they rolled over. So now Government policy is to argue that black is white—that the changes they sought to make in the constitutional convention are unnecessary and that the dangers they warned of are non-existent. That is a complete sell-out: it is a capitulation in the area of EU law that is arguably more important to Britain than any other—and in exchange for nothing. I shall quote President Sarkozy in the course of my remarks—not necessarily with approval, but I will say this at the outset: I fundamentally disagree with the Sarkozy vision of the EU, but I do not doubt for one minute that he has pursued what he genuinely believes to be the best interests of France, and I respect him for that—for defending, however mistakenly, the interests, as he perceives them, of the people he represents. Our Government, by contrast, know that the single market based on free and unfettered competition needs to be at the heart of a prosperous Europe. They set out to achieve that objective; they argued for it and tabled amendments in defence of it, all of which was perfectly honourable. But when the chips were down, they failed comprehensively.