Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill

We certainly do not want to do that if it will drain my legal aid budget. I accept that clarity is very important, and we hope that the clause provides clarity. In the first instance, when sentencing a young offender, the court should have regard to and the primary consideration should be the prevention of reoffending. We have a justice system that exists to tackle crime and, at its heart, needs to address offending or reoffending behaviour. Of course, it is the duty of the court to take into account the needs and interests of victims and the wider community, as well as those of the offender. We remain convinced that work to prevent offending must be in the young person’s best interests. A young person’s welfare must be considered in the sentencing process, which is why the courts are required to have regard to the welfare of the young offender. The courts are required to do that at present, and they will continue to do that. Much of the primary responsibility for the welfare of young people lies with the youth offending teams and service providers who have day-to-day responsibility for the child. In practice, it should be the responsibility of the youth offending teams to provide the court with the welfare background as part of the information provided in the pre-sentence report required before a community sentence may be made. The pre-sentence report is a key to effective working of the youth rehabilitation order, as it will act as a source document for the court’s decision-making process. The pre-sentence report needs to include all relevant details on the young person and put forward recommendations to the court on appropriate interventions. On the youth rehabilitation order, the recommendations should cover which requirements are appropriate and what their duration should be on the basis of an assessment of the individual young person’s needs. While I accept that it is fundamental that a criminal court, when sentencing a child or a young person, should have regard, as one of the primary considerations, to the welfare of the child, we cannot accept that that should override other considerations that a criminal court must take into account. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, asked me about Clause 9. The advice that I have received is that new Section 142A(3)(b) in Clause 9 is not subordinate to the purpose of sentencing, the principal aim of which is to prevent offending. Having considered what the noble Lord said about our international treaties, we said to the JCHR—we believe that we were right—that we thought that we were compliant with our international obligations.