Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill

I, too, shall speak to Amendments Nos. 66 and 69, so ably spoken to by the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, but I shall begin with a more general point. I confess that I am bemused by the meaning of, "““the principal aim of the youth justice system””." I have read it a number of times, have reflected on it since yesterday, and I still ask myself what the court can think when told: "““The court must have regard primarily to the principal aim of the youth justice system, that is, to prevent … reoffending … by persons aged under 18””." Obviously, it would not help to achieve that aim to send someone into custody, as the evidence is clear that to do so is a recipe for reoffending. What else does it mean? The court does not have the powers to take most of the measures needed to reduce reoffending, such as powers to commission a place in an adolescent mental health unit. I have learnt that the new youth justice legislation introduced in the Republic of Ireland gives the court the power to demand an appropriate mental health placement. The court does not have the powers to demand social work attention, a place in a special school, or any of those aspects of welfare provision that might help to reduce reoffending. The ““principal aim”” is an extraordinary and inflated view of what a criminal justice system can achieve or what is proper for a justice system to seek to do. This inflated idea of what the system can achieve has landed the Government in substantial difficulty. I want to move on to the detail of the amendments spoken to by the noble Earl, Lord Onslow. The Joint Committee on Human Rights was surprised to see the provision that in sentencing a child under 18 the, "““court must have regard primarily to the principal aim of the youth justice system … to prevent offending (or re-offending)””." The Explanatory Notes state: "““Article 3 CRC provides that in all actions concerning children their best interests are to be a primary consideration””." The Explanatory Notes accept that the duty in the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, which requires the court to have regard to the welfare of the child, applies, but this is subordinate to the principal aim of the youth justice system. The Joint Committee on Human Rights wrote to the Government and asked how they reconciled their position with their obligation under Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Government’s reply is worth quoting, although it is not that short: "““We believe it is right that welfare should not be the primary purpose of sentencing and Article 3 of the CRC does not require that it should be. It requires that the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. It is. That is why the welfare of the child is specifically mentioned in clause 9 as something the courts must have regard to when sentencing””." It goes on: "““A justice system exists to tackle crime. Then it must also consider the needs and interests of victims and the wider community which is why punishment must remain a purpose of sentencing.””" The Joint Committee on Human Rights, unsurprisingly, was not convinced by that reply. The committee therefore concluded that the effect of Clause 9 is to subordinate the child’s best interests to the status of the secondary consideration below the primary consideration of crime prevention. The committee therefore recommended that the provision subordinating the duty to have regard to the welfare of the child to the principal aim of the system should be deleted. It also recommended that the Bill should be amended to make it explicit that the welfare of the child should be a primary consideration. These two amendments seek to implement those recommendations. I am glad to support the noble Earl, Lord Onslow.