Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill

We continue the theme of our debates over the two days. I do not disagree with my noble friend Lord Judd’s eloquent argument about the need to treat a child as an individual. He emphasised prevention, rehabilitation and resettlement, with all of which I agree. I also agree with Members of the Committee who say that this should be about solving problems. I argue that the whole construct of youth rehabilitation orders is to help to solve problems, through the very nature and flexibility of those orders. I have never sought to argue that courts sentencing young offenders have a duty to have regard to their welfare. As I said yesterday, the principal aim of the youth justice system is and must be to prevent offending. If, in legislation, you essentially put it in the Bill that an exclusive focus is to be on the welfare of the child, you risk ignoring the rights of everyone else, including other children—who in many, if not most, cases, are often the victims of young offenders. ““Robustness”” and ““softness”” and the impact of the media are clearly important considerations in this matter. We do not legislate in isolation from the world around us. In a sense I am arguing along the same lines as I did in the previous debate. The Government are seeking a much more flexible community sentence response with YROs. At the same time, we must emphasise—public confidence is a factor here—that this is robust approach. It is intended to reduce reoffending. Where breaches are unacceptable, they will be dealt with. I do not think that that is an unreasonable description of a robust approach. I understand the sentiments behind the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, described the words as attractive. I understand that. Ensuring proportionality has to be an important part of what we seek to do. Paragraphs 6 and 8 of Schedule 2 require the court, when dealing with an offender in respect of a breach of a youth rehabilitation order, to take into account the extent to which the young person has complied with the order. We believe that the amendment is not necessary because the young person’s age and maturity are factors that are embedded in general sentencing practice. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, pointed out, Clause 9 sets out the purposes of sentencing and the factors that the courts must take into account when sentencing. The requirement for the court to have regard to the welfare of the young person still applies when the court is considering how to deal with a young offender who has breached a youth rehabilitation order. The court has every opportunity to consider all the circumstances of the breach, including any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In practice, the court will therefore already take into account factors such as age and emotional maturity when making any sentence decision on breach. These are important matters and factors that the court should take into account when deciding which interventions should be made and how long they should be. Why then should we not put that in the Bill as opposed to leaving it to the court or the Sentencing Guidelines Council? There could be a range of factors that the court will need to consider as personal mitigation, of which age and maturity are just two. Exactly which factors will depend on the circumstances of the individual. They might include the family circumstances of the offender. There are many matters that the court will have to consider, and it is often difficult to have a definitive list and to single out one or two factors that in some cases may not be as important as other considerations.