Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill

Indeed, and in my view all beliefs should be treated equally. The final reason for seeking to abolish this law is its impact on our ability to conduct our affairs in terms of international human rights and international relations, and to criticise other countries' uses of their blasphemy laws—for example, Sudan's outrageous use of its blasphemy laws against a UK subject over the naming of a teddy bear. It would be much easier to say that that was unacceptable if we did not have our own, albeit less effective, version of a blasphemy law. The same applies in respect of offences of apostasy in countries such as Pakistan. We would also be in a position to argue against the extremist reaction to the Danish cartoons if we did not have an offence purporting to defend Christian sensibilities. The argument for abolition is clear, and I hope that the Government have moved from their previous position that the time is not right. Because of the lack of time, it falls to me to say a brief word about amendment No. 231, which deals with homophobic hatred. On Second Reading, the Secretary of State agreed that it was right that a new offence of inciting homophobic hatred should be closer to the religious hatred end rather than the race hate end of the spectrum, in that such incitement would have to be intentional, and the provision should deal with threatening words and behaviour only. I welcome the fact that, true to his word, the Government are introducing an offence along those lines. We wanted to see that, because the clear mischief exists of people being attacked and hate being incited against them on the basis of their sexual orientation. Unlike religion, and more like race, sexual orientation is innate: it is not a matter of someone's opinion; it is a part of their humanity and our common humanity, and it is right that people should be protected. My view, which is reflected in one of the amendments, is that attacks on homosexuals involving an implication that they are paedophiles should be covered, and I hope that the Government will give more thought to that. There is a case for tightening the provision further by ensuring that the Attorney-General's fiat—the decision that the Attorney-General makes to give consent to a prosecution—should have particular regard to article 10 of the European convention on human rights. Amendment No. 231 uses exactly the same language that the Government used in section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 when they called on courts to have particular regard to freedom of expression when considering issues concerning privacy law and the press. On that basis, I hope that the Government will give serious thought to amendment No. 231, and I commend new clause 1 to the House.