Serious Crime Bill [Lords]

With respect to the hon. Gentleman, the point that I was making, as I think every other hon. Member appreciates, was that one of the problems of an independent judiciary is that it sometimes makes decisions or interprets the law in a way that he and others find difficult. The hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon said that centuries of tradition were in danger of being swept away, but all that I was I saying is that people sometimes see centuries of tradition being swept away when they disagree with something that the Government propose. As with all things, we need to reach a compromise. I am grateful to everyone for contributing to the debate and will now turn to some of the points that have been made. On serious crime prevention orders, I emphasise the potential usefulness of a flexible measure against those who engage in insidious crimes with intelligence and adaptability. The orders can be made only, as McCann stated, when it can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the subject has been involved in serious crime. The conditions contained in the orders will only be preventive, not punitive, and will be entirely in accordance with the European convention on human rights. Two categories of points seem to have been made in the debate: those about principle and those about practice. On principle, the main points were about whether the orders would be a means of circumventing the criminal process. One particular point made by Opposition Members was why we would want to prosecute when we can seize assets and impose major restrictions on liberty on the basis of an ex parte hearing. Those who made that point were wrong. It will not be possible to seek these orders on an ex parte basis and the interpretation of the way in which the orders work is a complete misunderstanding of the Government’s intention. The orders will not be an easy option to be used in place of criminal prosecution—their purpose is completely different. Prosecution is about punishing previous actions, whereas these orders are about preventing future involvement in serious crime. In addition, to assert that the orders are an easy option is to misunderstand and underestimate the role and expertise of the High Court. The applicant authority will have to convince the High Court, to a standard that we expect to be close to beyond reasonable doubt that the proposed subject of an order has been involved in serious crime. That will be no simple task. As we may recognise, High Court judges do not fall over themselves to agree necessarily with the Government’s view. The court is a public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998 and so will only make an order that is reasonable, proportionate and compatible with convention rights.