Serious Crime Bill [Lords]

I do not say that, in itself, such a provision is not right. However, we must ask ourselves whether we have cumulatively reached the point at which so many of the consequences of a conviction are imposed on an individual without trial that we are essentially bypassing the due process that has been achieved through hundreds of years of sacrifice, effort and often blood by our ancestors. The consequences of the Bill for the individual involve the seizure of his property and the stigma of guilt, because on this sort of evidence he would have to be found liable—and finding someone liable means that he would have to be found liable for having committed serious crimes. On the back of that finding by the judge, presumably on written evidence alone, the individual might be able to make representations, but he would not be able to call a fully fledged trial or give his own evidence in oral testimony, as no provision appears to exist for that. The individual would be liable to have his liberty restricted in ways unprecedented in common law. The provisions—these are only non-exhaustive examples—allow the court to make an order placing prohibitions and restrictions and all sorts of requirements on his holding of property; his business dealings; his enjoyment of his property; his working arrangements and even the way he communicates with his associates; on the premises to which he has access; on where he lives and on his travel. Short of imprisoning him, what more on earth could be done to restrict liberty without the evidence on which convictions would ordinarily follow, but merely on the balance of probabilities? With the greatest of respect to the Minister, this Bill imposes on an individual almost all of the consequences of a conviction, short of imprisonment. It allows the judge to say where the individual should live, who he should meet, with whom he should communicate, where he should work and what he should do. Where is the difference in fundamentals—save for the iron bars placed across the window—between that and imprisonment? What procedure will be adopted for that? Affidavits will be submitted in secret to a judge, often on information that would never be seen in a criminal court, and based on flimsy second or even third-hand hearsay. It is not surprising that we should become aware of the voices whom the Government so often treat with disdain and contempt—the ““shenanigans”” of defence lawyers was how they were referred to by the Minister for Security, Counter Terrorism and Police, but I refer to them voices of liberty and justice—and to the voices of the Law Society and the Bar Council. All those voices are raised in protest, concern and anxiety about a Bill that would remove fundamental principles from our public life. Of course they are concerned—if we place a weapon of that nature in the hands of the Executive, its power will inevitably be used in circumstances not contemplated by us. We will have no control over it. We will have no say in how it is implemented. It will be handed to the Director of Public Prosecutions, the director of Revenue and Customs and the director of the Serious Fraud Office and they will decide who is targeted as the subject of these applications. My hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South Downs (Nick Herbert) referred from the Front Bench to the Government’s intention to ensure that the legislation hits only those describable as ““Mr. Big””, but that is not so. Let us look at the 2006 consultation paper, which makes it as clear as a bell that the Government view this as an alternative to prosecution. I ask the Minister either now or in his summing up to clarify the circumstances in which such a power will be used. Let us analyse some of the circumstances envisaged in the consultation paper:"““circumstances in which civil orders could play a role where prosecution is not feasible, alongside prosecution or as an alternative to prosecution.””" It provided examples, referring to"““significant numbers of individuals at the fringes who cannot be pursued in the main trial, and for whom a separate trial is not thought worthwhile.””" What we are contemplating is the use of those draconian powers to restrict people’s liberty without any admissible evidence, simply because of the expense and inconvenience of bringing them to trial. That is what the consultation paper says. It refers to ““case management reasons”” for objecting to ““over-large trials””, saying that it might be preferable to deal with those who are marginally involved by bringing one of these orders rather than prosecuting to trial. I ask right hon. and hon. Members to reflect for a moment on the significance of that proposition. No longer does evidence have to be brought. No longer do the hard graft of investigation, the assembling of case and its bringing to court have to be gone through. All that is necessary is to pop along to a High Court judge on the strength of a number of affidavits and get an order against someone. The consequence is that the inconvenience and tedium of bringing through to a trial and persuading 12 ordinary people in a jury box that a man is guilty can simply be circumvented by that device. A man can be virtually imprisoned, his assets stripped, his name and reputation taken away, yet there is no need to bring him to trial. We are not talking about Mr. Bigs. These are people described in the words of the Government’s own consultation paper as ““essentially peripheral players”” who might"““step up to leadership in the organised crime group””." On that basis, although they are peripheral an order will be made against them. In my respectful and urgent submission, the House needs to reflect very carefully about whether, if they truly are peripheral players, so heavy and blunt an instrument should be placed in the hands of the Executive on so slender a basis. What did the consultation paper say about the Mr. Bigs? It was suggested that they might be subjected to these orders where there is sufficient evidence to justify an order to a civil standard, but insufficient for a conviction. That goes directly against what the Minister for Security, Counter Terrorism and Police told us in opening the debate today—that in essence the burden or standard of proof would be the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. If that is right, what is the need for the provision? If it has to be established beyond reasonable doubt, that is essentially recreating a criminal trial in a civil court. Of course, the consultation paper did not say that and nobody really believes—not even, I suspect, the Minister—that the criminal standard of proof can conceivably apply in those circumstances. It will be a civil standard of proof and merely a question of probabilities, not of reasonable certainties. What does the consultation paper say about that? It explains why a Mr. Big, instead of being prosecuted, properly convicted and sentenced by a judge, should simply be subject to this summary-type of procedure based on written evidence and no trial. It says that it can be justified because of the quantity of the evidence or because some of it is in a form not admissible in criminal proceedings, but that can be used in civil cases—namely, hearsay. It was argued earlier that, since the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the admissibility of hearsay in a criminal trial has now become so relaxed that there is in fact not a very significant difference between genuinely probative hearsay and its admissibility in a criminal trial, and genuinely probative hearsay and its admissibility in a civil trial. Be that as it may, what the consultation paper is essentially saying is, ““We don’t have the evidence against this person. We can’t prove that they are involved in serious crime. We haven’t got the necessary foundation to deprive this man of his liberty, to strip him of his assets, to take away his good name and to impose restrictions on him that would have a substantial effect on his family.”” The orders in the Bill would have just such effects. Let us make no bones about this: the House is being asked to accept that a truncated, abbreviated kangaroo procedure should be adopted to visit upon an individual the consequences of a conviction because the state does not have sufficient evidence to convict him. I ask Members on both sides of the House to reflect on whether we ought to admit that as a principle in this House. It is in this House that so much sweat, toil and effort has been put into the cause of freedom and liberty. Should we, on a quiet Tuesday afternoon, allow so fundamental a principle to pass without at least a voice of protest being raised or critical and constructive opposition being mounted? Our ancestors would have gone to the stake before permitting the Executive to restrict an individual’s liberty in this draconian way. Let us look at some of the other bases on which an order could be made. In another place, Baroness Scotland outlined the circumstances in which a manufacturer or business man was making items that could facilitate crime. She gave as an example the production of cargo storage containers with false bottoms, saying that such equipment would plainly be manufactured with little else in mind but a criminal purpose. The orders might therefore be used to prevent such items being manufactured. We might also think of those who manufacture speed camera detection equipment. Those are machines that people have in their cars to tell them when they are approaching a speed camera. I do not have one; I do not know whether the Minister does.