Serious Crime Bill [Lords]

My hon. and learned Friend makes a good point. Just as the Government make great play of their desire to take cases out of the courts in developing their summary justice programme, of which they regard ASBOs as being a part, there is no doubt that in this instance they seek an alternative means of dealing with serious criminals. That may mean that the proper avenues of court procedures will not be followed, and that no safeguards or checks will enable the House to monitor or assess on an ongoing basis the extent to which these provisions are being used for their proper purposes. Despite Government concessions in the House of Lords, the raft of restrictions that GASBOs could impose is extensive. They include restrictions on those with whom a person can communicate and on where a person can live, work or travel. They may also include requirements to answer questions, provide information or produce documents. The Government say that the High Court will provide oversight, but as Mr. Justice Sullivan said in the context of control orders, to which these measures bear some relation, judicial involvement in the making of such orders can be no more than a ““thin veneer of legality”” which ““cannot disguise the reality””. As was pointed out earlier, the definition of serious crime includes"““fishing for salmon, trout or freshwater fish with prohibited implements””." We thought that the Bill was designed to deal with the untouchables, the modern-day Al Capones; now it seems that it could be used to target Pop Larkin. The Secretary of State can also modify the list by order, which the Conservatives consider unacceptable. If there is to be an extension of the crimes to which these measures can apply, given the supposed serious nature of those crimes, it should be made by primary legislation. We will pursue that point if the Bill reaches Committee. As a former deputy chief constable, John Stalker, said,"““criminals should be dealt with under the criminal law…super-ASBOs, as these are being called, are not the answer to heavyweight criminals. They may be OK for hoodies on the street””—" but, he said, they were not appropriate for more serious criminals. These are the key questions. Where are the safeguards to ensure regular review of the orders? They do not exist in the Bill. On what basis will the effectiveness or reasonableness of the orders be judged? In Committee, we will consider measures to ensure that such safeguards are placed in the Bill. In its report on the Bill, the Joint Committee on Human Rights commented:"““In our recent work on counter-terrorism policy and human rights we have drawn attention to the unsustainability in the long term of resort to methods of control which are outside of the criminal process and which avoid the application of criminal standards of due process. We are concerned that the introduction of SCPOs represents a similar step in relation to serious crime generally. In our view, the human rights compatible way to combat serious crime in the long run is not to sidestep criminal due process, but rather to work to remove the various unnecessary obstacles to prosecution, for example by relaxing the current prohibition on the admissibility of intercept material””." That leads me to clause 4 and to schedule 13, which was inserted in another place against the Government’s wishes. Both provisions relate to the use of intercept evidence. There are already a range of practical measures that would strengthen our ability to bring terrorists to justice, and we believe that the introduction of intercept evidence in court is the single most effective step that the Government could take today to make the country safer. The Home Secretary says that intercept evidence is not a silver bullet. Of course; there are no silver bullets when it comes to dealing with terrorism. But why is the UK one of only two countries in the democratic world that does not use intercept evidence? Many arguments have been put against the use of such evidence. They include the argument that terrorists will cotton on to what is happening and that the means of the intercept will be revealed. But as Andy Hayman, the assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan police in charge of counter-terrorism, told the Home Affairs Committee:"““I think that this is now well and truly worn-out because I think most people are aware of that. It does not stop them still talking but they are aware of the methodology so that is a lightweight argument.””"