Serious Crime Bill [Lords]

I am afraid that that was not entertaining. Very unusually for a man of the law like the hon. and learned Gentleman, it was obtuse. My answer goes back to the point made by the hon. Member for Monmouth (David T.C. Davies). I think that the House will agree that, in relative terms at least, we are probably well covered for homicide, terrorism and a range of other serious crimes. This Bill is designed to fill the gaps and lacunae that exist in the law, and its scope does not extend to every crime that, however remotely, could be construed as serious. As I said earlier, the Bill and schedules have been devised precisely to fill what we perceive to be holes in the existing legislation covering serious and organised crime. An ongoing review of homicide law will report in due course. The hon. and learned Gentleman is esteemed for his knowledge of that legislation: he should point out what he considers to be serious gaps in it to those carrying out the review, and not to me. I am sure that they will be pleased to hear from him, but this debate is not the appropriate location for such observations. As I was saying, clause 1 proposes serious crime prevention orders. Their name makes it clear that they will prevent the harm caused by serious crime before it occurs. They are not a punitive measure. They will be used only against those whom it has been proved to have been involved in serious crime. All hon. Members will have received the briefing from Liberty. In advance of discussion here and in Committee, I must note that—unusually—it contains important inaccuracies. In the main, I have high regard for Liberty briefings, even though I sometimes I disagree with them, but this one is littered with unfounded assertions and important inaccuracies. It seems to belong more to the Paris Hilton school of intellectual rigour, as it does not live up to Liberty’s usual standards. The briefing states, for example, that"““the Government may hope that these orders are a way of getting round the presumption of innocence because the applicable standard of proof will be the lowest civil standard of ‘on the balance of probabilities’””." That is absolutely wrong. My noble and learned Friend Baroness Scotland stated categorically in the other place that, in keeping with the House of Lords judgment in the case of McCann, we expect that the standard of proof required in relation to the question of whether a person has been involved in serious crime will be the same as in criminal cases, namely ““beyond reasonable doubt.”” Liberty’s assertion is thus entirely unfounded—a bit of a shame. Contrary to the statement in the briefing, the purpose of the orders is not to avoid the full rigours of criminal prosecution; they are aimed at preventing future behaviour, not punishing past behaviour. If a criminal prosecution is possible, it will be brought. As set out in clauses 1 and 6, the orders will contain only conditions that prevent the subject from further involvement in serious crime. That is set out clearly in the Bill and goes against Liberty’s assertion that the conditions that can be put in place would amount to criminal sanctions. The conditions will be decided by the High Court, or the Crown Court in the case of an order made immediately on conviction, and can and will act only in a way that is compatible with convention rights.