Offender Management Bill

moved Amendment No. 34: 34: After Clause 2, insert the following new Clause— ““Power for probation boards and probation trusts to make arrangements for provision of probation services (1) This section applies to any probation provision which the probation boards and probation trusts consider ought to be made for the purposes mentioned in section 2(1)(a) and (b). (2) Probation boards and probation trusts may make contractual or other arrangements with any other person for the making of the probation provision. (3) Arrangements under subsection (2) may in particular authorise or require that other person— (a) to co-operate with other providers of probation services or persons who are concerned with the prevention or reduction of crime or with giving assistance to the victims of crime; (b) to designate individuals as officers of a provider of probation services; (c) to make contractual or other arrangements with third parties for purposes connected with the probation provision to be made, including, in particular, contractual or other arrangements— (i) for provision to be made, or for activities to be carried out, by third parties on behalf of that other person; or (ii) for individuals who are not members of that other person’s staff to act as officers of a provider of probation services. (4) Probation boards and probation trusts may not make arrangements under subsection (2) unless a plan has been prepared for that year. (5) In this section a ““plan”” means a plan prepared under section (Requirement for probation trusts and probation boards to prepare plans).”” The noble Baroness said: I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 35, 45, 48A and 84. The question I seek to address is: where should the power of commissioning be vested? We say that it should be vested locally whereas the Government say that it should be with the Secretary of State. Earlier today I listened carefully when the Minister moved her local area network agreement amendments. She tried to persuade us that the Government’s heart was still beating, that there was no concern that they would override local wishes, that Dr Reid was kind and caring—well, we shall see—and that the Government would deliver these services in a way that complies with local wishes. We heard about local influence, local delivery and local flavour. However, enhancing local flavour does not have much to do with vesting power in local communities. That is where the difference between us lies. My amendments are designed to ensure that probation services are primarily commissioned locally by probation trusts and that commissioning is not centralised in the hands of the Secretary of State, who, I agree, may devolve his power of commissioning to a ROM. It may be subcontracted out to somebody to provide the service, but under the Bill the decision-making and control are in the hands of the Secretary of State. The amendments would also provide a backstop position whereby the Secretary of State would retain the power to commission services where the trusts fail to do so. That is the fill-the-gap syndrome to make sure that a service is provided. They would leave intact the Government’s proposals for the development of contestability as the basis upon which probation services will be provided. I hope that that makes it crystal clear that the Government’s stated objective of involving the voluntary and private sectors to a much greater degree can still be met within a system of local commissioning powers. We have made it plain throughout our debates here and in another place that we do not oppose the principle of contestability and wish to see it given its chance to prove its worth. We have no philosophical or political objection to probation services being provided from outside the existing public provision. However, we continue to have serious doubts about the Government’s ability to develop contestability appropriately. Those doubts are addressed by other amendments, in particular my amendment to introduce the super-affirmative procedure regarding the removal of the protections for core services in Clause 12. Here I concentrate my objections on the Secretary of State’s proposals to strip local probation trusts of their powers to use their local knowledge to best advantage and to commission services to meet perceived local needs. Last year we saw the Government push through a statutory instrument to change the probation boards into what they term more ““business-like”” trusts. That was the terminology that they used in the letters that went out to the probation boards. In one breath the Secretary of State says that he wants to make probations trusts ““business-like”” but in the next he makes it clear that they cannot be trusted to exercise that business-like acumen because he seizes from them the authority to commission services. Clause 3 imposes a system under which contracts will be awarded centrally by the Home Secretary or, at best, by the persons to whom he has delegated power—his regional offender managers, who are accountable to him. The line of accountability goes upwards to him. The Bill gives central control over what service provision should be and how it should be delivered. The goalposts in Clauses 1 and 2 are wide and, as we have seen, Clause 1 can be changed by statutory instrument. We believe that local trusts are in a far better position than the Secretary of State to identify the types of services that will be required in their area and the agencies or persons from whom those services should be commissioned. The difference between us is that the Government are saying that they would take that into account and we are saying that it should be the account of what should happen; they should direct it. The Government have acceded to the requests made in both Houses that there should be local authority representation on the trusts; that allows local knowledge and accountability to be fed in through elected members of local authorities. That influence and information falls short of providing the local decision-making that we seek. We have had extensive debates on the nature of probation services throughout both days in Committee, and they have been extremely valuable in highlighting the commitment of this House to making probation services serve our local communities not only well but very well indeed. On community sentences, we must put first and foremost the issue of public confidence in the services provided. The offenders are not just people living in their local community; they are seen to be serving sentences that should relate to the effect on the local community. The community needs to have confidence that the offender is being appropriately managed, that the sentence reflects the concern that the local community expresses about crimes committed locally, and that the results of the sentence are likely to be rehabilitation and a reduction of reoffending. If we are to have any hope of extending the use of community sentences widely, there needs to be confidence among members of the judiciary, especially the lay magistracy, that they can impose a community sentence that will be properly administered. The Government have so far failed to convince us on these Benches that their centralising model will command the confidence of the public in the delivery of probation services that will serve the needs of their community. I have tabled the amendments to give the Government the opportunity to put a better case. I turn now to the technical explanation of my amendments. I realise that it is late; it is always unfortunate when one reaches the most important group of amendments at such a time, but that is the luck of the draw. Amendment No. 34 vests a power in probation trusts to commission probation services. It shadows very closely the Government’s drafting for Clause 3 as it was before it was amended, but it ensures that the primary power of commissioning is vested locally, not centrally. It adds a condition that the probation trusts cannot commission services unless and until they have made a plan for the year. As ““businesslike”” bodies, that should come naturally to them, but we felt that it was right to put the guarantee into the Bill to ensure accountability. Amendment No. 48A sets out our proposed new clause after Clause 3, which gives the detail of that guarantee. It specifically gives the Secretary of State one of our two backstop powers in this group of amendments. If the Secretary of State believes that the trust’s plan does not provide for sufficient services, he can modify it. Amendment No. 35 provides the main backstop power for the Secretary of State. Where services are not provided under our proposed new clause after Clause 2, he may either provide those services himself or commission others to do so, either by contract, partnership or any other means appropriate. We are trying to be as flexible as the Government alwayssay one should be. Amendment No. 45 removesClause 3(5), the Government’s definition of a provider of probation services. Amendment No. 84 inserts a new clause before Clause 7 detailing our own definition of a provider of probation services. We had to provide a new definition because it has to fit in with our package of amendments to enable local commissioning of services, but it also covers a situation where the Secretary of State exercises his backstop power and either commissions services or provides them himself. The Minister and her Bill team will have noticed that the amendments in this group are very different from and much more comprehensive than those tabled by my right honourable friends and honourable friends in another place, but they have the same objective of achieving local commissioning while ensuring that the Secretary of State retains a backstop power. They have been drafted in an attempt to amend the Bill in such a way as to make it workable. I realise that the amendments tabled in another place would not have had the right effect. They had the right intention and they had the heart, but they did not have the body to carry it out. I wish to give the Committee an opportunity to consider these amendments so that I may listen carefully to comments and consider how they should best be dealt with between now and Report. I anticipate that they will require some redesign. In the mean time, I beg to move.