Statistics and Registration Service Bill

moved Amendment No. 135: 135: Clause 27, page 11, line 36, leave out ““in writing”” and insert ““by order”” The noble Baroness said: In moving Amendment No. 135, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 144 and to Clause 27 standing part, which are in the same group. Clause 27 creates the usual draconian power of direction which the Government reserve for public bodies. Our natural instinct is to oppose this power remaining in the Bill because it is the very antithesis of the independence that should be created by it. How can there be proper independence for the Statistics Board if it has to look over its shoulder the whole time to see whether it is upsetting the Government or the devolved Administrations? The Government have not made their case for this power to be established in the Bill, which is why we have opposed the Question that Clause 27 stand part of the Bill. The Explanatory Notes offer no specific assistance either. Why is the power needed and in what circumstances do the Government believe that the clause will be activated? The Bill refers to a ““serious failure”” by the board to comply with its objective or to perform any of its functions, but the judgment is that of one man: the Prime Minister, now that our earlier amendments have replaced the Chancellor. Let us suppose that the board had reached a judgment on the proper calculation of efficiency in the National Health Service that showed that the Government’s policies were resulting in a massive waste in the NHS—noble Lords will recognise that this is not a fanciful example—or that the board decided that changes were needed to crime statistics which had the effect of showing the Government’s achievements in a bad light. Again, this is not a fanciful example. What is to stop the Prime Minister stepping in and saying that he considers that the board has not complied with its objective in this regard? He might argue that it would not serve the public good if public trust in the NHS or in the police were so undermined by the new statistics that it would perhaps create social unrest. It is not only the Prime Minister who has this power, but also the devolved Administrations. They have the power to step in and exercise the functions of the board if the direction is not complied with. I believe that this is an unusual component of the conventional power of direction, which is why our Amendment No. 144 would delete subsection (12). What precedents exist for such a power—not the power of direction but of step-in? In what circumstances has such a power been used in practice? Clause 4 contains the usual, wide-ranging grounds for the removal of the chairman and the other non-executive members. Can the Minister envisage a situation where Clause 27 (12) could be invoked to allow the Government to step in and act, but where the provisions of Clause 4 did not allow the removal of the chairman and the non-executives? I remind the Minister that Clause 4 allows removal where a member is, "““unable, unfit or unwilling to perform his functions””." Why is that power not good enough to change the board? Why does there have to be a power of direction backed up by the power to step in as well? The Bill is weighted towards circumscribing the independence of the board. That is why we believe that if the power is to remain in the Bill, and especially if it is to include subsection (12), more parliamentary oversight is required. It is helpful that the direction is to be laid before Parliament, but that does not amount to a parliamentary process. Accordingly, Amendment No. 135 would require a direction to be made by order. This is a modest amendment, because it requires by virtue of Clause 62 only the negative resolution procedure, of which the Minister will be aware we are normally dismissive. The important point is that it would not impede the operation of an order, if it were ever determined that one were necessary and urgent, but it would allow a parliamentary debate if appropriate. That is an essential protection for the Statistics Board. Powers of direction are important not because they are often used—history shows that they are used rarely in the public sector—but because the threat of their use is a subtle, or even overt, bargaining counter between the holder and the object of the power. That secret weapon of control will be made less sinister if all parties know that Parliament will have a proper role if the power is used. I beg to move.