Statistics and Registration Service Bill

I note the right hon. Gentleman’s comments. I tend not to make comments on such matters, although they have been related to me in the past. However, there is not one Scottish Labour Member in the Chamber, which is not usual in debates such as these. I will relay the right hon. Gentleman’s comments to my friends in Plaid Cymru. The fundamental propositions in the legislation relating to the amendments are as follows. First, clause 3 gives the impression that an appointment to the new board will be made from each of the devolved Administrations, but the measure permits nothing of the kind. In fact, the Bill states that the appointments will be made by the Treasury. Secondly, the legislation purports to allow the devolved Administrations the authority to step in if things go wrong in the future, to direct, if the board has failed either"““to comply with its objective, or…to perform any of its functions relating to…devolved statistics””." In certain circumstances, the provision will allow the Administrations to take over those functions. However, that power, like the power to appoint, is not what it seems. The power to direct can be used only with the direct consent of the Chancellor himself, as set out in clause 27(2). Given that such direction could be carried out only after failures relating to statistics that are the direct responsibility of the devolved Administration, the requirement for the Chancellor’s consent represents an overbearing and unnecessary interference in the day-to-day operations of the devolved Administrations in the production of their statistics. That is the aspect of greatest concern to me, and I shall return to it. It is wholly wrong to allow the Chancellor the power of veto to stop a devolved Administration exercising, rightly, the power to direct if the new board fails to carry out its responsibilities for devolved statistics. Thirdly, the Bill appears to offer the devolved Administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland the power to instruct the disclosure of information to and from public bodies and the new board. However, those powers, too, are not all they seem. The powers for Scotland under clauses 45 and 49 can be used only with the consent of the Treasury. Like the power to direct, the power of disclosure applies only to information required for statistics in areas under the direct authority of the devolved Administration. The legislation for Wales is different, not least because when the Treasury wants to make disclosures relating to Wales it must, as described in clause 44(8), first seek the consent of a Welsh Minister. My amendments address those three issues. They would give Ministers in the devolved Administrations in Scotland and Wales both the respect that their mandate should allow and, more important, the full range of powers that they ought to have to carry out their work armed with the best, most accurate and relevant statistical information they need. Amendments Nos. 49, 50, 57 and 58 are designed to take particular cognisance of the needs of the nations by ensuring that a member from each of the devolved Administrations is appointed to the new board. Amendments Nos. 51, 52 and 59 would confer the right to direct without the Chancellor’s veto. Finally, amendments Nos. 53 to 56 would ensure that the power of disclosure in Scotland could be exercised as required in relation to wholly devolved statistics. I want to remove the unnecessary Treasury veto. Earlier, I said that my most serious concerns were about the need for the consent of the Chancellor in relation to the power to direct, so I look forward to the Minister’s response to the amendments on that subject. However, the Treasury has shown some willingness to move. Amendment No. 26, which will be discussed in the next group even though it relates directly to the group under discussion, gives a welcome transparency about direction. My difficulty with amendment No. 26 is that that welcome transparency would apply only after consent had been granted, not in advance. I hope that the Financial Secretary can go a little further tonight and show a little more movement. If he could tell the House that consent will routinely be granted in normal circumstances, that would be helpful. Better still, if he could tell the House the specific circumstances in which consent would normally not be granted and perhaps give an example, that would be welcome. If he could tell us that consent would not be granted only in circumstances in which the public disclosure of a direction against a particular set of statistics would be market-sensitive or the set of statistics against which a direction was made would be market-sensitive—if those were the sorts of conditions or criteria that would apply when consent to direct was not given—it would go a long way towards soothing my concerns over the requirement for consent from the Chancellor before a direction could be given by one of the devolved Administrations in the case of a failure by the new board.