Statistics and Registration Service Bill

I certainly agree that whatever Department we choose, we are unlikely to eliminate entirely the possibility of conflict, but it is more intense in relation to the Treasury than it would be in relation to the Cabinet Office. We have to bear in mind that the Cabinet Office has a long-recognised remit to co-ordinate the activities of different Departments, which would also equip it appropriately for the functions that we are considering. The Treasury may try to exert considerable control over Departments to an unprecedented degree, but cross-departmental co-ordination is still the formal responsibility of the Cabinet Office, acting on behalf of the Prime Minister. The co-ordinating role features prominently in its departmental objectives. As has been emphasised throughout the debate, the work of the board can and should go beyond scrutinising the economic statistics traditionally associated with the ONS. The board’s work should encompass a wide range of social statistics on crime, education, health and social exclusion, which are produced by a range of Departments. It is therefore appropriate that the Department tasked with residual ministerial functions should have an eye for cross-departmental concerns. With the insight that one would expect from an organisation with a long and distinguished history, the Royal Statistical Society, which has contributed so helpfully to the debate, tells us that what we need is ““an honest broker””. I think that we are more likely to find one in the Cabinet Office than in the Treasury. Secondly, we must ask which Department will give the board and the National Statistician the most effective assistance in bringing other Departments into line when they fail to live up to the code of practice. That returns us to territory that we covered briefly when discussing the role of the National Statistician. The House would do well to listen to the advice given by Lord Moser, whose wisdom has been called upon a number of times this evening. Giving evidence to the Treasury Committee, he was adamant about the importance of a link with the Cabinet Office, in which he saw a re-emphasis on the direct link with the Prime Minister, to whom that Department reports. He said"““This is a very real link… I would see the Prime Minister quite regularly and he would take serious interest. That obviously was a great strength, especially vis-à-vis other departments. So it was much less difficult to influence other ministries when it was known that behind me was the Prime Minister.””" Lord Moser has made clear his view that the decision of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) to shift responsibilities relating to the ONS from the Cabinet Office to the Treasury was a mistake. One of Lord Moser’s more controversial successors, Len Cook, pointed out:"““Almost all of the current concerns involve departments where only the Prime Minister has authority to challenge ministers.””" Today, we have an opportunity to rectify the error made by my right hon. and learned Friend. We may now have a Chancellor who is perhaps considerably more powerful than the Prime Minister, but there is no guarantee that that will continue to be the case. It would therefore be valuable for the board and the National Statistician to have the direct backing of both the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister. Thirdly, we must ask which Department will be most effective in arguing the case for the board and statistical services in determining the appropriate level of funding. We believe that the Cabinet Office would be the most effective, for the simple reason that it is not the Treasury. It can provide a ministerial voice outside the Treasury to argue the case for statistical services. It is well known that each Department must argue its case for funding with the Treasury. Under the structure envisaged by the Bill, that would involve one Treasury Minister strolling down the corridor for a chat with another Treasury Minister. There would be no external pressure on the Treasury. Even institutions at arm’s length from the Government, such as the BBC, tend to rely on a Minister to speak up for them on funding matters, although of course they have the opportunity to make their own case directly as well. The Minister dismissed similar arguments in Committee, on the ground that there would be no debate on funding between Ministers of the kind that I have described because the Bill would take the board’s funding out of the normal spending round. We believe that funding decisions should be taken out of the hands of Ministers and transferred to Parliament. If that were done, my third question would become irrelevant. There would be no need for a Minister to speak up for the board in the spending round because Parliament, not the Treasury, would make the decision. Sadly, however, that is not how the Bill is drafted. All we are told about funding is that it will be determined on a five-yearly basis by a ““transparent formula””. What the Minister has told us so far about the funding arrangements is insufficient to give me confidence that the board will not need a Minister to stand up for it in negotiating with the Treasury. There is a fourth reason why we think the Cabinet Office would be a better home for the residual ministerial responsibilities in the Bill. Here I pray in aid the analysis of my hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Mr. Fallon), who said that in transferring residual responsibilities to the Cabinet Office we would demonstrate that we were making a visible difference. Tom Griffin, the former director of statistics at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, said:"““To sever the link with the Treasury now…would be a very visible move towards independence.””" Severing that link would constitute a further break with the current arrangements, which all now agree have not worked satisfactorily. We believe that it would make a useful contribution to building trust in official statistics, and we commend the amendments to the House.