Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

My first point is that I am extremely glad that Lord Carlile has produced yet another report. We are fortunate to have him to provide insights into the way in which the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 operates. I have to say that I was anything but convinced on the subject. The Minister will understand that I have taken a position of principle on the matter, with regard to the former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Norwich, South (Mr. Clarke). I have the gravest reservations about the way in which the Act was passed, after an all-night sitting, and about the construction of the Act. We are not talking about merely technical matters; questions of liberty are raised, and I am deeply worried about the fact that people are not necessarily being given the full opportunity to have their cases adequately considered in the courts in the right manner. I was so concerned about the Prevention of Terrorism Bill when it was before the House that I produced my own Bill, called the Prevention of Terrorism (No.2) Bill, the essence of which was to provide, in a couple of clauses, that we would not ring-fence the Human Rights Act 1998. However, my Front-Bench colleagues insisted on doing so through an amendment to the Government’s Bill. It is essential that it is understood that my Bill would have provided for due process, a fair trial and habeas corpus for alleged suspects. As I say, a question of liberty arises, but unfortunately, the 2005 Act has a convoluted construction because of the problems of entirely avoiding having to deal with the unfortunate implications of the Human Rights Act. There was the whole concept of non-derogating control orders to consider, as well as the Act’s convoluted language, and the struggle within it. As one reads the Act, one can picture the draftsman desperately trying to achieve the objectives, which are to provide for proper public security, and to keep under proper control people who are, or who are alleged to be, a serious danger to the public. By the way, given that three of the people subject to control orders have absconded, it does not seem to have worked. One can sense from the very wording of the statute the desperate struggle of parliamentary counsel, who were trying to keep themselves within the framework of the Human Rights Act as far as possible, and that became the object of the exercise. It is a simple fact that if we had legislated without reference to the Human Rights Act, we could have come up with solutions that would have enabled us to achieve all the objectives, namely public security, giving a fair trial to the people against whom there are allegations, providing them with due process, and ensuring that there was habeas corpus. A red judge, as we call them, can be made available at any time, and as Lord Justice Steyn has said, the most sacred duty of any judge is to support the notion and the practicality of habeas corpus. However, as I put it to the former Home Secretary, who was in such a muddle when answering questions that I asked during proceedings on of the Government’s Bill and before then, what has been created is a mish-mash—an inadequate, unstructured Act of Parliament that simply does not serve the purpose of maintaining public security on the one hand, or of ensuring fair trial, due process and habeas corpus on the other. Those are my intrinsic objections, and they cannot get more lethal than that. I understand entirely why my hon. Friend, and good friend, the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) said that the Opposition will, with great reluctance, support the Government today. In all fairness, I appreciate that there are complications, but the Minister himself admits that the current situation is not a satisfactory way of dealing with things. Surely this is not the basis on which Parliament should be legislating. Today, the Front-Bench spokesmen on both sides of the House are agreeing, in a virtually empty House, to continue an order that is of huge importance, not only because of the noble Lord Carlile’s report, but because of the intrinsic questions that it raises about the relationship of the state to the individual, the liberty of the subject and public security. The measures are to be put to the House on a Thursday afternoon, in a continuation order, after one and a half hours of debate. The issue of great importance, and we were kept up all night to discuss these incredibly important matters on an emergency basis, but everybody knows that the legislation is not working properly. I will not carp and be disrespectful, but with the greatest respect to my hon. Friends and Government Members, I point out that we are faced with legislation that is inadequate, hopeless and convoluted. It aims to deal with the central problem of how to balance the needs of public security in relation to terrorism with the issue of liberty, but I regret that we could not come up with a better solution, and that we will continue in limbo for another year. That is extraordinary, which is why I intend to vote against the order, and I have informed the Whips accordingly. It is a matter of concern that we have not had a long enough debate to deal with these serious issues. There has not been a single mention to the 28-day period. Although it was agreed in the House that 28 days would be the maximum, I have always expressed grave doubts about whether that period would be sufficient. We have only one and a half hours to deal with a matter that led a Home Secretary to resign and provoked enormous debate and, given the Prime Minister’s insistence on 90 days, revolt in the Cabinet. So far, however, that period has not even been mentioned. Two former Attorneys-General in the House of Lords said that the minimum period ought to be 45 days. No doubt, they talked to Lord Carlile about the implications of his report and the issues that arose from it. I accept that at this stage it has not been necessary to take up the full 28 days, but that is not the issue, as we must consider whether or not it is necessary to increase that period in the coming year. I do not know the answer, but we have an arbitrary cut-off date. I am not wedded to 90 days, and would probably settle for 60 or even 45. When the matter was first debated, I believe that Conservative Front-Bench spokesmen did not even want to change the limit to 14 days, although I may be wrong about that. The limit gradually increased until the 28-day period was accepted. However, whether it is 28 or 14 days, that will not necessarily solve the problem at a given time. If we provide proper, fair trials—even the worst terrorists are entitled to a fair trial—and if there is due process, with habeas corpus and proper safeguards from a red judge to ensure that suspects are not ill-treated, alleged suspects can be held for a reasonable length of time. Given modern communication methods and the difficulties highlighted in reports by the Metropolitan police and others, it may be necessary to extend the period beyond 28 days.