Government of Wales Bill

I am grateful that the Under-Secretary acknowledged that the clause, which was amended in the other place, raises serious problems. It is not common practice for the House to pass measures that can apply retrospectively. Retrospective powers enable the Government to interfere with private rights in a way that is contrary to the principles of the rule of law in this country. For the Under-Secretary to claim that the provision is simply a balancing exercise under the Human Rights Act 1998 is an inadequate response. The Human Rights Act might be a basic safety net to deal with certain Governments who do not have democratic practices or who have had them only for a short period and do not enjoy the principles of the rule of law, but it does not replace the rule of law. Private legal rights operate because the rule of law says that they do, and because the judges say that they do. Sometimes, we have had to face the fact that the people who benefit from those rights appear to be remarkably undeserving of them. We have, for example, had debates about lords of the manor who have enforced a form of blackmail in respect of rights of way over common land until a court judgment removed them. However, no one in their right mind ever suggested that that entitled Members of Parliament to remove those people’s rights retrospectively, thereby depriving them of a financial advantage. The Government are contemplating a measure that is being introduced with a desire to rectify technical omissions—I fully accept that that is their intention—but that could have the unintended consequence of depriving someone of a private legal advantage, because it will be applied retrospectively. There is no suggestion in the proposals that any compensation would be made to a person who was thus adversely affected. This matter was raised in the other place, and Lord Kingsland, who was speaking for the official Opposition, suggested that these clauses should be removed altogether. However, he was mindful of what the Government were trying to achieve. The amendments that were eventually passed therefore sought not to remove the retrospective power but to limit it by saying that such an order could be made, provided that it was"““not to the detriment of those who have either benefited from or acted in reliance upon the state of the law before the retrospective Order is made””." As an issue of principle, the Minister cannot possibly contend that that is an unfair provision. He might, however, say that the proposal would have the consequence of making it impossible to pass such a retrospective order. I can see his point. If that is his problem, however, he is going to have to find a way of solving it, either by specifying that anyone adversely affected would be entitled to full compensation or by some other method. It is not good enough simply to say that there will be a balancing exercise and that the measure would be used only in cases where the public benefit appeared overwhelmingly to outweigh the private advantage. Private law and people’s rights under the law are not about the balancing of public rights with private advantage. Private advantage has complete supremacy. The principle under which we operate in this country in maintaining the rule of law is that if we interfere with someone’s private rights, as specified in the Human Rights Act and the European convention on human rights, we must pay them compensation for doing so. I am really troubled to read the Government’s approach to this matter. In the letter that Lord Evans of Temple Guiting wrote to my noble Friend Lord Kingsland, he said, with reference to the point at which the provision would kick in:"““The Secretary of State would have to consider any action carefully for its compatibility with human rights. He would not move the goalposts by seeking to change retrospectively the law on which a case was based while that case was before the court and without the leave of the court.””" That is why I picked up the Minister’s comment that the Government would not seek retrospectively to alter a court judgment. When I challenged the Minister on that, he started to back off a little. He left me with the distinct impression that the Government might choose to act retrospectively, before a case came to court, to prevent a person from exercising his legal rights and to challenge an order that had been made. He also left me with the distinct impression that there might be circumstances in which, notwithstanding a court judgment, the Government would still seek to apply the provision retrospectively.