Police and Justice Bill

I fully understand that concern has previously been expressed about the apparent breadth of the consequential amending power in Clause 29(3)—in particular that it might be used to alter the nature of the chief inspector’s inspection functions. I want to make clear that that has never been our intention. The clause relates only to any additional non-inspection functions that Ministers might wish to confer on the chief inspector in future. In another place, we amended the wording of subsection (1) to make that clear. In the context of such hypothetical non-inspection functions, we consider it sensible to allow maximum flexibility to accommodate adoption by the inspectorate of new functions in the future. Such functions might relate to activities referred to in other legislation. For example, Schedule 1l(11) amends the Police Act 1996 to enable the new inspectorate to continue to contribute to the membership of police appeals tribunals. Consequential amendments to the present provision might also be needed—for example, to make further arrangements under Schedule 9 in respect of staffing or expenditure consequent on additional functions. The power to make such consequential amendments, in so far as it is used to amend primary legislation, will be subject to the affirmative procedure, as stated in Clause 47(5)(b), so parliamentary scrutiny of its use in that respect is guaranteed. As the power relates only to non-inspection functions, we do not consider it appropriate to add a consultation requirement relating to bodies which are to be inspected. Amendment No. 142 seeks to add the body or bodies which are to be inspected by the chief inspector to the list of bodies who must be consulted before Ministers direct the chief inspector to carry out an inspection. Such a direction may be in respect of any specific part or aspect of the courts, criminal justice or immigration enforcement systems, or any specific matter falling within the scope of the chief inspector’s duties. That power is intended for use in particular in situations where significant under-performance by a part of one of the inspected systems is causing ministerial and public disquiet or concern, or to commission an investigation by the chief inspector of a serious incident relating to the areas of work inspected—such as that recently carried out by the Chief Inspector of Probation in the case of Rice. We do not consider that it would be appropriate for Ministers to be required formally to consult the body which was to be subject to such an inspection or investigation. In practice, Ministers are likely to take the advice of senior officials, including the chief of the body concerned, when deciding what action to take. To go further than that would risk damaging the flexibility and independence which are crucial in such interventions. Amendment No. 145 adds the body or bodies which are to be inspected by the chief inspector to the list of bodies who must be consulted by the chief inspector on his proposed inspection programme and inspection framework. We indeed intend that the chief inspector shall consult the inspected bodies on the inspection programme. Accordingly—I am sure that this will bring some cheer—I am happy to accept Amendment No. 145 in principle. We would envisage a provision whereby the chief inspector was under a duty to consult on the inspection programme with the bodies that he proposes to include in that programme and we will bring forward such an amendment at Report. I trust that, having heard that, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment and that Members of the Committee will work with us to achieve what we jointly want in the spirit of Amendment No. 145.