Police and Justice Bill

I have rarely been showered with such compliments. ““Extreme folly””, ““stupid””, ““silly””, ““without light””—the compliments flowed from all around the Committee. I say straightaway that it is no part of the Government’s intention to restrict, limit or water down the independence of the inspectorate. If we were trying to silence the inspectorate, I respectfully suggest that this would be a very odd method to adopt. It would be odd, too, in view of the individuals that we have historically chosen to fulfil the role, in relation not only to prisons but to the Crown Prosecution Service, probation and police. All the inspectorates hold one thing in common: they are led by rigorous, independent free spirits who do not restrain themselves one iota from being not only one thorn but a number of thorns in the side of any Government—and I welcome those thorns. It is of absolute importance that any Government should be assured that the rigour and vigour necessary to undertake robust and effective inspection remains. They are, as the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, rightly said, the stuff of which security is made. If we had wished to choose a puppet—someone who would bow to the Government’s will—it would be odd indeed to have chosen the names of Tumin, Ramsbotham and Owers. No matter which complexion of Government we have benefited from, nothing in our history indicates that the Government of the day are so foolish as to choose someone who lacks that vital component of independence of spirit. If that was our intent, we have failed in a consummate way. Let me put to rest the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, that this is an attempt to silence the inspectorate, and the suggestion made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, that we in some way intend to rein it in. The noble and learned Lord and I have both laboured in the job of lawyers and he knows that we look for evidence—and the evidence is that we have always failed to do that because we have never tried to do it. I can assure the Committee that it is no part of our intention to do that now. Let us look at the issues that have arisen. All around the Committee it is said that we do not need to change—the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, said, ““If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it””—and others say that this immutable position must remain. Regrettably, we are seeking to deal with a 21st-century difficulty with a 20th-century model. In moving forward, we have to look at the most effective way of guaranteeing the rights of individuals, the improvement of the conditions in which they are held and a better understanding of the fact that the criminal justice system is now interlinked. Why do I say that? Because before 2003—and I go back to the report of Lord Justice Auld—it was clear that the criminal justice system was not working well in unison. Each part individually was of superb construction. I would compare it to the erstwhile Olympic relay team that the Americans were blessed with: fast, the best in its field, effective, superb, a thing of beauty. But it lacked one essential component: an understanding that in a relay you have to have a baton, that the baton has to be passed from individual to individual, and that the only way you win is by going across the line. We needed to create a quintessentially British relay team—perhaps not quite as fashionable or as sleek, but knowing a number of things: first, what a baton looks like; secondly, to whom it must be given; and, thirdly, what the finishing line looks like and where to go through it. That was one of the problems with which the criminal justice system was faced. We have done a lot to bring its components closer together—the creation of the National Criminal Justice Board, the creation of the local criminal justice boards, working together through the crime and disorder reduction partnerships, and the work with the local strategic partnerships have all played their part. However, we have also learnt that the management of offenders has to be end-to-end, and that if we are to inspect the system and the way in which individual offenders and victims move through it, we have to understand it end-to-end. Inspecting in silos will no longer be a proper way of inspecting the system, because things have now changed. Decisions in relation to the criminal justice system are made at different points and are interconnected. Now the Crown Prosecution Service is responsible for charging. The role which the courts play is significantly different after the 2003 Act. Probation and prisons are no longer separate—they have to work in unison if we are to have end-to-end management. It is proposed that the probation service should have the role of offender manager. Part of the period will be spent in custody; part will be spent in the community. How that works will be of critical importance. The role which education, health and the other factors play within prison and how they are linked to the community becomes more important. Inspecting those issues in addition to, not instead of, the role which is currently played by each of the inspectorates becomes of additional importance. It is not our proposal to diminish in any way the specific role currently undertaken by the Inspector of Prisons. I hear what is said about the Inspector of Prisons and I endorse it, but I endorse too the high international regard in which our inspectors of police, probation and courts are similarly held. It would be wrong to say that the inspectorate should be differentiated in that way, albeit that we celebrate what has been done by our inspectors. We have fully registered the concerns that have been expressed about the position of the Chief Inspector of Prisons. We recognise and will preserve the vital role that she plays in safeguarding the human rights of prisoners and detainees. However, we need an inspection regime that looks at the offender management process from start to finish through custodial and community settings. A single chief inspector for the justice system will be able to say unequivocally what is wrong with the system as a whole and what needs to be done to put it right, especially at the joins where the activities of a different agency interface. For example, it is no longer enough to assess the provision for an offender’s educational needs by reference to the facilities available in prison without considering provision in the wider community before and after custody, as I have sought to explain. We recognise that dedicated inspection of treatment and conditions of prisoners is indispensable to protect human rights. We have therefore preserved in full, as a distinct duty of the new chief inspector, the existing statutory remit of the Chief Inspector of Prisons. That will ensure that this special form of inspection remains a priority. The new chief inspector will have a statutory duty, when staffing the inspectorate, to maintain sufficient expertise and experience relating to the systems and organisations inspected. The new chief inspector will continue, like the Chief Inspector of Prisons, to be able to set the criteria for inspections. We can give an assurance that prison inspection will be in terms of domestic and international human rights standards rather than service standards or government targets. The new chief inspector, not Ministers, will set inspection criteria, and he or she will be entirely free to set criteria derived from core legal and human rights, as is currently the case with the Chief Inspector of Prisons. There will be no change. That will enable the United Kingdom to continue to meet in full its international obligations in relation to prisons. The Committee will note, too, the requirement to consult the chief inspector before using the power of direction, which must be done in even the most urgent cases. We expect that the chief inspector will bring his or her independent voice to any such consultation. The new chief inspector will continue, like the Chief Inspector of Prisons, to make unannounced inspections as he or she sees fit. The inspector will also, like the Chief Inspector of Prisons, be a statutory independent officeholder appointed by the Queen. He or she will report directly to Ministers and will be able to publish reports and require them to be laid before Parliament. He or she will be free to criticise government policy if that is producing the wrong outcomes for prisoners and detainees.